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Book Reviews
THE EMPIRICAL JUDICIARY
CONSTITUTIONAL FICTIONS: A UNIFIED THEORY
OF CONSTITUTIONAL FACTS. By David L. Faigman.'
Oxford University Press. 2008. Pp. xiii + 230. $65.00.
A. Christopher Bryant2
INTRODUCTION
In Gonzales v. Carhart, the Supreme Court sustained the
constitutionality of the federal Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act
without overruling its decision seven years earlier invalidating a
nearly identical Nebraska law. 3 In doing so, the Court sided with,
though conspicuously did not defer to, Congress's factual finding
that the banned procedure was virtually never medically neces-
sary, rejecting the contrary conclusion of all six lower federal
courts confronted with challenges to the federal law. The ruling
shone a spotlight on the methods, or lack thereof, that the Court
employs in receiving evidence and resolving disagreements
about questions of legislative facts in constitutional cases.
The ruling was merely the most recent of numerous cases in
which the result turned on disputed questions of legislative fact.
Examples from the Supreme Court's last decade can be found in
1. John F. Digardi Distinguished Professor of Law, University of California, Hast-
ings College of Law.
2. Professor, University of Cincinnati College of Law. I am grateful to Lou Bilio-
nis, Paul Caron, David Faigman, Emily Houh, Betsy Malloy, Bill Marshall, Tom McAf-
fee, Darrell Miller, Michael Solimine, Verna Williams, and Ingrid Wuerth for helpful
comments; Anna Dailey, Brennan Grayson, and Kane Kayser for excellent research as-
sistance; and the Harold C. Schott Foundation for financial support.
3. Compare Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007) with Stenberg v. Carhart, 530
U.S. 914 (2000).
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nearly every substantive area of constitutional law, including the
dormant commerce clause, the scope of congressional power to
regulate interstate commerce and enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment, the requirements of the due process and the equal
protection clauses thereof, as well the freedoms of religion and
expression. Moreover, the centrality of legislative facts to consti-
tutional litigation is nothing new. To some extent their signific-
ance is an inevitable corollary to judicial review, which makes all
the more astounding the judiciary's failure to establish a consis-
tent or coherent approach to resolving questions of legislative
fact. Over the course of the last century, few issues have more
persistently or profoundly perplexed judges than how they
should address questions of legislative fact when reviewing the
constitutionality of a challenged statute.
Nor has the subject received the kind of sustained scholarly
investigation its import clearly merits. Though the problem is a
ubiquitous and recurring one, scholarly efforts to solve it tend to
come in waves, several scholars addressing the question during a
brief span of time (often in response to one or two salient deci-
sions) and then ignoring the matter for years. But an issue that
implicates the very legitimacy of judicial review ought not be ig-
nored. So David Faigman's Constitutional Fictions: A Unified
Theory of Constitutional Facts merits celebration for taking up
such an important and too-often neglected subject.
His book should be celebrated for more than its topic, how-
ever. Constitutional Fictions does the legal profession an invalu-
able service by identifying and articulating the many frequently
unspoken questions that arise in the context of judicial consider-
ation and resolution of facts, especially legislative facts, in consti-
tutional cases. The book also documents the largely unremarked
ubiquity of these questions, the wide variety of circumstances in
which they occur, and the depth of the theoretical issues they
implicate. These are not mean achievements, as they outstrip the
occasional efforts of some of the most distinguished legal scho-
lars of the past century. Professor Faigman accomplishes all this
in crisp, lucid, and admirably concise prose. Nor could Professor
Faigman's book be more timely. Several of the Roberts Court's
most salient and controversial constitutional decisions have
turned on questions of legislative fact.
Constitutional Fictions treats an important topic with im-
pressive insight and grace. But it will not be the last word on the
subject. Professor Faigman may have planned an exhaustive
study, but instead the subject appears to have exhausted him.
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When Constitutional Fictions finally comes round to normative
and prescriptive analysis of the status quo, Faigman shies away
from the broader implications of his critique. As he acknowledg-
es, the Supreme Court has been unpardonably opaque and in-
consistent in its treatment of questions of legislative fact in con-
stitutional cases. These are not venial judicial sins.
But Faigman proves too tolerant of the Court's disarray and
the resulting judicial freedom from constraint. Ultimately he
concludes that meaningful judicial review makes much of this
indeterminacy inevitable. Implicit in this reasoning is an exces-
sively muscular conception of judicial supremacy, or even exclu-
sivity, in the implementation of the Constitution. After briefly
reviewing Faigman's arguments, this essay explores how other
models of the roles different institutions properly play in consti-
tutional practice might compel more sweeping changes than he
suggests.
Part I of this essay situates Constitutional Fictions within the
pre-existing scholarly framework. The second Part then summa-
rizes the book's substantial contributions towards greater recog-
nition and understanding of the present doctrinal disorder con-
cerning legislative facts in constitutional cases. Part III identifies
issues with, and alternatives to, present judicial practices not ad-
dressed in Constitutional Fictions, in the hopes of compiling a
catalog of questions for future research.
I. PRIOR EFFORTS
To appreciate fully Faigman's distinctive contribution, it
must be assessed in the context of the pre-existing treatments of
the subject; hence this Part briefly canvases those efforts. The
implications of judicial determination of legislative facts4 in con-
stitutional cases first garnered scholarly attention in the wake of
the Supreme Court's decision in Lochner v. New York. Lochner
of course served as precedent for judicial disapproval of numer-
4. As used herein, "legislative facts" are facts of general applicability that do (or
do not) support the public policy judgment leading to the enactment of legislation. At
least since the early 1940s, commentators and jurists have distinguished legislative from
adjudicative facts, which concern the application of a general rule to the unique, concrete
circumstances of a particular dispute. See, e.g., Kenneth L. Karst, Legislative Facts in
Constitutional Litigation, 1960 S. CT. REV. 75, 77 (noting that the "phrase virtually be-
longs to Professor Kenneth C. Davis") (citing KENNETH C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW TREATISE § 15.03 (1958)).
5. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
2009]
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ous Progressive Era efforts to regulate wages, hours, and work-
ing conditions in an increasingly industrialized American econ-
omy.
6
In 1916 then-Harvard law professor Felix Frankfurter pub-
lished a survey of judicial rulings on the validity of laws limiting
working hours.7 He concluded that "study of these opinions indi-
cates a change not only in the decisions but in the groundwork of
the decisions," adding that the "turning point comes in 1908 with
Muller v. Oregon."8 The future New Dealer and Supreme Court
Justice wrote in his typically self-assured fashion. Nevertheless
he failed to hide his fundamental ambivalence about the judicial
determination of legislative facts in constitutional decisions. De-
scribing a trend towards greater judicial receptivity to maximum
hours laws, which he ardently applauded, he came close to en-
dorsing a minimalist and highly deferential judicial role in ad-
dressing such matters. He noted that a chief virtue of the more
recent rulings was that they recognized that questions concern-
ing the propriety of limits on hours of labor were matters of de-
gree "solely for the legislator." 9
But elsewhere in the essay, Frankfurter assiduously pre-
served a substantial role for courts in re-examining the factual
basis for such legislation. He stressed the value and necessity of
Brandeis briefs such as those Louis Brandeis himself famously
filed in Muller. Ultimately, he explicitly declined to choose be-
tween judicial abdication and judicial reinvestigation characte-
rized by what he described as attention to "scientific" principles:
"either the legislative judgment should be sustained if there is no
means of judicial determination that the legislature is indisputa-
bly wrong, or the Court should demand that the legislative
judgment be supported by available proof."' Frankfurter con-
cluded his survey with an optimistic prophecy that once the fac-
tual nature of these kinds of controversies became apparent, the
legal profession would bring to bear its formidable resources and
resolve the conundrum in some way not yet apparent to him. Ni-
nety-three years later, Frankfurter's hopes have not been ful-
filled.
6. See generally David A. Strauss, Why Was Lochner Wrong?, 70 U. CHI. L. REV.
373, 373-74 (2003).
7. Felix Frankfurter, Hours of Labor and Realism in Constitutional Law, 29
HARV. L. REV. 353 (1916).
8. Id. at 362 (citing Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908)) (footnote omitted).
9. Frankfurter, supra note 7, at 367.
10. Id. at 372.
HeinOnline -- 25 Const. Comment. 470 2008-2009
BOOK REVIEWS
To be sure, others have tried. Writing in the Harvard Law
Review nine years deeper into the Lochner Era, Henry Wolf
Bikl6 focused on cases in which the constitutionality of legisla-
tion depended upon the courts' assessment of "some question of
fact which the statute postulates or with reference to which it is
to be applied."' Professor Bikl6 acknowledged that judges' legal
expertise did not accord them any inherently greater aptitude to
determine such questions than that enjoyed by the proverbial
man in the street. 2 He postulated further, perhaps with Frank-
furter's earlier commentary in mind, that "a substantial part of
the criticism which has been leveled against [judicial review was]
due to the fact that decisions have been made which turn on the
resolution of these underlying questions of fact."'' 3
After listing the various ways, ranging from a priori reason-
ing to reliance on findings made by state supreme courts, that
the U.S. Supreme Court had resolved such questions, Bikl6
urged the Court to uphold statutes unless the formal record of
judicial proceedings included proof of facts showing the law to
be unconstitutional. 4 Recognizing that scrupulous adherence to
such requirements could swamp the federal courts, Bikl6 sug-
gested that some "machinery" be established whereby such
questions could be explored and pertinent factual records could
be compiled before the matters found their way to federal court.
BiklM6 pointed to the proceedings before the Interstate Com-
merce Commission as a possible model. Of course, as to many
economic, industrial, commercial, and environmental activities,
Bikl6's proposal has proven prophetic, insofar as the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act 5 provides for judicial oversight of the
massive federal bureaucracy currently regulating such matters.
Far from all constitutional litigation flows through these chan-
nels, however. And the Court has never bound itself to the kind
of "on the record" requirement Bikl6 proposed.
So the issue Frankfurter and BiklM6 addressed not only out-
lived them but was fueled by the rise of the administrative state.
Accordingly, after a period of neglect, the issue was again taken
up, albeit sporadically, by some of the foremost constitutional
11. Henry Wolf Bikl6, Judicial Determination of Facts Affecting the Constitutional
Validity of Legislative Action, 38 HARV. L. REV. 6, 6 (1924).
12. See id. at 6-7.
13. See id. at 7.
14. Id. at 21-22.
15. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59, 701-06 (2000).
2009]
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scholars of the second half of the twentieth century. 16 A tho-
rough exploration of their work exceeds the narrow confines of a
book review. Nonetheless, the particularly noteworthy contribu-
tions of Archibald Cox merit mention. The Harvard law profes-
sor and former U.S. Solicitor General published two articles in
which he examined the relative capacities of Congress and the
Supreme Court to determine legislative facts in human rights
cases.
Cox celebrated the Court's Voting Rights Act rulings
handed down in the October 1965 Term of the Court. In particu-
lar, he lauded the Justices' decision to borrow from commerce-
clause case law, and extend to the enforcement clauses of the
Reconstruction Amendments, a "presumption that facts exist
which sustain [congressional] legislation and... [judicial] defe-
rence to congressional judgment upon questions of degree and
proportion." Cox also approved the Court's recognition of
Congress's relative institutional strengths, among them a supe-
rior ability to determine questions of legislative fact, in devising
means for the protection of core constitutional values.1 8 Just five
years later, however, Cox conceded that his earlier synthesis of
the Court's cases had been overly optimistic. Upon reflection he
found it "hard to divine whether the Justices have developed a
philosophy concerning the weight to be given legislative deter-
minations of fact, characterization, or degree in civil liberties
cases," ' 9 a judgment as accurate today as when first spoken. So
while the controversy surrounding judicial determination of leg-
islative facts in constitutional cases is an ancient one, the legal
profession's understanding of it remains inadequate.
II. JUST THE FACTS
Faigman opens his book by discussing illustrative examples
of judicial incoherence in the reception of constitutional facts.
He makes a case study of the Supreme Court's efforts to deal
16. See, e.g., Dean Alfange, The Relevance of Legislative Facts in Constitutional
Law, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 637 (1966); Henry J. Friendly, The Courts and Social Policy:
Substance and Procedure, 33 U. MIAMI L. REV. 21 (1978); Karst, supra note 4; Henry P.
Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85 COLUM. L REV. 229 (1985); Arthur S. Miller
& Jerome A. Barron, The Supreme Court, the Adversary System, and the Flow of Infor-
mation to the Justices: A Preliminary Inquiry, 61 VA. L. REV. 1187 (1975).
17. Archibald Cox, The Supreme Court 1965 Term-Foreword: Constitutional Ad-
judication and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80 HARV. L. REV. 91, 107 (1966).
18. Id. at 118-21.
19. Archibald Cox, The Role of Congress in Constitutional Determinations, 40 U.
CIN. L. REV. 199, 213 (1971).
HeinOnline -- 25 Const. Comment. 472 2008-2009
BOOK REVIEWS
with the related questions of when, for constitutional purposes,
human life begins and ends. He adeptly demonstrates that the
relevant cases are utterly inconsistent in their treatment of ques-
tions of constitutional fact and reflect a more universal confusion
about the way in which such questions should be resolved.
Faigman follows this introduction with an examination of
his subject's philosophical foundations. Specifically, he surveys
the debate between scientific realists 20 and their more skeptical
critics. In doing so, Faigman both reveals his own (quite modest)
starting assumptions and situates his project within a broader
debate about the nature of human knowledge. As he explains,
antirealists insist that facts and values are inextricably intert-
wined, whereas Faigman, like other scientific realists, maintains
that "facts can exist independent of biasing influences" (p. 24).
This makes possible the distinction between constitutional law
and constitutional fact upon which his book is based. The conse-
quence of these assumptions is that lawyers and judges can and
should "take facts seriously" (p. 24), even (especially?) when re-
levant to constitutional litigation. Put another way, Faigman ar-
gues that, because facts exist independent of the values of their
beholders, courts have a duty to discover them, rather than just
employ them "rhetorically, as premises that can be manipulated
or massaged in the service of one or another legal outcome" (p.
25). Throughout the book Faigman exposes the Supreme Court's
relentless tendency to do the latter.
The next four chapters constitute the heart of the book,
wherein Faigman explains how and why the Court has dealt so
carelessly with constitutional facts. This effort starts with a tax-
onomy of constitutional facts that improves upon the well-worn
but highly influential distinction Kenneth Culp Davis made be-
tween adjudicative and legislative facts.2' Insofar as the former
class matters to constitutional rulings, Faigman denominates
them "constitutional case-specific facts." He divides the latter
class into two subcategories based on the function the facts per-
form in the court's constitutional analysis. "Constitutional doc-
trinal facts" concern or even determine the content of legal rules
that become tenets of constitutional law. "Constitutional review-
able facts," in contrast, relate to the application of legal rules to
20. Scientific realists, discussed in the text, ought not be confused with legal realists.
On the latter, see, for example, LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE: 1927-1960
(1986).
21. See supra note 4.
2009]
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particular circumstances, though such facts still transcend the
parties presently before the court. Faigman acknowledges that
these categories, while distinct in theory, are not always easy to
distinguish in practice (pp. 46-49).
A single area of First Amendment jurisprudence illustrates
these distinctions. In explaining its decision to exclude "obsceni-
ty" from First Amendment protection, the Court has asserted
that exposure to obscene material degrades the moral sensibili-
ties of the community22 and may even increase the incidence of
antisocial behavior.23 These claims concern matters of legislative
fact, because they extend beyond the parties to any particular
obscenity prosecution. Within Faigman's taxonomy, they are
constitutional doctrinal facts, because the Court asserts them in
support of its choice of a legal rule, namely a free speech doc-
trine with an exception for obscene material. The Court has de-
fined obscenity to exclude material having "serious literary, ar-
tistic, political, or scientific value., 24 Whether a specific work is
of sufficient value to exempt its authors, publishers, or distribu-
tors from liability, however, is a question of constitutional re-
viewable fact. It is legislative rather than adjudicative in nature
because the Supreme Court has made it clear that the value of a
work does not "vary from community to community., 25 Thus,
such a determination transcends any single obscenity prosecu-
tion. But because this factual issue concerns the application of an
established legal standard rather than the announcement of a
new one, it is, to use Faigman's terminology, a constitutional re-
viewable (rather than a doctrinal) fact.26
Faigman's decision to classify different types of legislative
facts according to the function they serve in constitutional analy-
sis is a sound one. As I argue below, however, this insight might
profitably be taken even further.
The next chapter, on the "Constitution's Frames of Refer-
ence," explores the ways in which the Supreme Court has mani-
pulated the distinction between facial and as-applied challenges
to statutes in order to frame constitutional questions so as to fo-
22. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 59, 63 (1973).
23. See id. at 60.
24. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
25. Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 500 (1987).
26. The question, however, of the work's offensiveness, another requirement of the
legal test for obscenity, is limited to the specific geographical context of that particular
prosecution. See id. Accordingly, such an issue concerns a constitutional case-specific fact
(p. 57).
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reordain their answers. These frames of reference matter for
present purposes because they dictate the form issues of legisla-
tive fact take in constitutional cases. Case specific facts are most
likely to be relevant to constitutional questions posed at a highly
specific level of generality, whereas reviewable or even doctrinal
facts are more likely to be pertinent to those asked and ans-
wered at a more abstract level.27 In United States v. Salerno, the
Supreme Court insisted that a facial challenge to a statute may
succeed only where "no set of circumstances exists under which
the act would be valid., 28 Faigman joins the majority of com-
mentators in dismissing Salerno's dictum as the product of "ro-
mantic notions of a restrained judiciary" and "timeworn banali-
ties of judicial restraint" (pp. 65-66). In Part III, I argue that
these banalities deserve more of a hearing than Constitutional
Fictions accords them.
In any event, Faigman insists that his critique "does not de-
pend upon a belief in expansive judicial authority" (p. 66). And
he is surely correct to chastise the Court for its selective and in-
coherent application of the Salerno rule. Faigman argues that
this confusion is merely one manifestation of the Court's more
general inattention to the essential (but often implicit) selection
of the appropriate level of generality for resolving constitutional
controversies. He calls upon judges (especially Justices) and
lawyers to be more self-aware in making these choices. As he
demonstrates (pp. 73-78), their neglect has made possible much
mischief, at times allowing courts to play a constitutional shell
game.
Assuming the constitutional fact issues have been properly
framed, questions remain about the correct approach to their ini-
tial resolution by trial judges and subsequent reevaluation by
appellate courts. These problems are the ones most in need of
fixing, for as Faigman acknowledges the judiciary's practices in
receiving and evaluating proof of legislative facts in constitution-
al cases are "chaotic," and "procedural guidelines and evaluative
guideposts" are nonexistent (p. 98). At the trial-court level, tes-
timony offered as proof of legislative facts must satisfy the de-
manding standards of evidentiary rules, frequently including the
27. As Faigman colorfully puts it, "the question of what frame of reference to em-
ploy.., largely involves choosing between reviewable facts or case-specific facts as the
denomination of constitutional currency" (p. 97).
28. 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1986).
2009]
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rigorous scrutiny applicable to expert witnesses.2 9 On appeal,
however, amici, who are under no obligation to demonstrate re-
levant expertise, file briefs packed with assertions of legislative
fact, which may then be relied upon to justify reversal. Nor is the
Court guided by any "overriding theory of when it should be de-
ferential to other bodies -judicial and nonjudicial-that have
made findings of constitutional fact" (p. 114). This disorder has
consequences. As Faigman rightly observes, the indeterminacy
of modern constitutional law can to a significant extent be traced
to the Court's refusal to recognize, let alone rationalize, the role
legislative facts play in constitutional adjudication. The status
quo maximizes the discretionary authority of the Justices to the
detriment of fundamental rule of law values.
But Faigman offers only the most modest and precatory so-
lutions, largely because he deems the present state of affairs to
be inevitable. For example, he dismisses as "unrealistic and un-
helpful" pleas that assertions of legislative fact be subjected to
the rigors of the adversarial process. His explanation is that be-
cause such assertions concern facts that "transcend any single lit-
igation, and thus have precedential import, the development of a
factual record cannot be left to the parties" (p. 100).30
Similarly, Faigman defends de novo judicial review of a leg-
islature's factual findings, at least where important constitutional
rights are implicated.3 He goes so far as to dismiss as essentially
irrelevant considerations of comparative institutional compe-
tence. Though he nowhere explicitly says as much, these conclu-
sions apparently rest at least in part on an inchoate assumption
of absolute judicial supremacy. Earlier in the book he demon-
strates that disputes about legislative facts ultimately concern the
meaning of the Constitution (pp. 88-90). The implicit syllogism
seems to be that (1) with a few exceptions, it is for the Court to
tell the country what the Constitution means, (2) resolving issues
of constitutional fact is a component of constitutional interpreta-
tion, and therefore (3) the Justices must enjoy the same freedom
in deciding questions of constitutional fact that they enjoy in de-
ciding questions of law. Were the major premise relaxed to ac-
knowledge that other institutions also properly put flesh on the
29. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
30. The possibility, however, deserves more discussion than he gives it. See infra
Part IIIA.
31. But cf Note, Judicial Review of Congressional Factfinding, 122 HARV. L. REV.
767, 767 (2008) (concluding that the "Court's lack of solicitousness to congressional fact-
finding is indefensible on both constitutional and prudential grounds").
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Constitution's bare bones, the conclusion would to that extent
merit reconsideration. Faigman also stresses the ultimate need
for uniform resolution of constitutional questions, which, he rea-
sons, precludes Supreme Court deference to what often amounts
to a multiplicity of fact-finders (p. 116).32 Here again, however,
there is more to constitutional facts than is dreamt of in Profes-
sor Faigman's philosophy.
III. QUESTIONS NOT ASKED
As the preceding synopsis shows, Constitutional Fictions
vastly improves upon the pre-existing legal literature. By recog-
nizing the subject as one demanding trans-substantive examina-
tion, Faigman highlights for scholarly scrutiny a fundamental
element of the actual practice of judicial review too often ig-
nored by judges and their critics.
The book's most significant and original contribution is its
insight that disputes about legislative facts in constitutional cases
are really disputes about the meaning of the Constitution itself.
Resolution of those disputes cannot be separated from the task
of constitutional interpretation. Put more concretely, "[p]art of
the exposition of any constitutional rule should include a state-
ment of which party-the challenger or the State-has the bur-
den of proof [as to pertinent legislative facts] and at what level of
proof that burden must be met" (p. 101). While this injunction
may seem elementary, it connects issues of legislative fact to the
work of constitutional interpretation in a clear, concise, and
practical manner that significantly exceeds prior efforts. Moreo-
ver, were the injunction to be honored, it would effect dramatic
change in the way constitutional cases are litigated and decided.
Thus, the revelation of the relationship between constitutional
facts and constitutional meaning was in itself a major achieve-
ment.
Unfortunately, Faigman fails to explore the full ramifica-
tions of that observation. At several points in his analysis he in
32. The emphasis here on the need for finality and uniformity echoes one of the
academic literature's more prominent arguments for a strong version of judicial supre-
macy in constitutional interpretation, namely that such a role for the Court provides a
means for settlement of otherwise persistent and divisive controversies. See, e.g., Larry
Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110
HARV. L. REv. 1359, 1371 (1997) (arguing that a strong version of judicial supremacy is
necessary to fulfill the "settlement function of law").
2009]
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effect treats this insight as the end, when in reality it is just the
beginning, of analysis. Faigman tacitly assumes that the Supreme
Court must have the pre-eminent role in assessing legislative
facts in constitutional cases. He even rejects some efforts to re-
gularize or channel this function, apparently on the ground that
judges, and especially Supreme Court Justices, must remain free
to pursue these questions however they choose to do so. He rea-
sons that "[j]ust as no court would defer to the parties to say
what the law is, no court should rely on the parties exclusively to
say what the reviewable facts are" (p. 100).
But the analogy goes only so far. Whereas judges are pro-
fessional referees of legal reasoning, they can lay no similar
claim to expertise about the wide array of empirical questions
that come before them. Those questions run the gamut of social
and scientific knowledge. To rely upon judges, especially appel-
late judges limited by the record created below, to know or dis-
cover the answers to these questions is at least as problematic as
relying upon the parties to do so. There must be better answers
to this problem.
A. THE REMAND OPTION
On occasion the Supreme Court has, when confronted with
a dispositive but disputed question of legislative fact, remanded
the constitutional case to the trial court with directions to sup-
plement the formal evidentiary record. The Court's 1994 and
1997 Turner Broadcasting decisions33 illustrate this approach. At
issue there was the constitutionality of the "must-carry" provi-
sions of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Compe-
tition Act of 1992, which required cable television providers to
dedicate a portion of their channels to carrying local broadcast
television stations.3 4 Congress imposed this requirement to pro-
tect local broadcasters from cable companies, which, Congress
had concluded, increasingly enjoyed monopoly status in most
markets.35
Shortly after the Act became law, numerous cable operators
and programmers filed suit in federal court claiming that the
must-carry provisions violated the Free Speech and Press Claus-
33. Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner II), 520 U.S. 180 (1997); Turner
Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner 1), 512 U.S. 622 (1994).
34. Turner I at 626.
35. Id. at 623; see also Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act
of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-385 § 2(a)(16), 106 Stat. 1460, 1461 (1992).
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es of the First Amendment.36 After a three-judge district court
rejected the plaintiffs' constitutional challenge and upheld the
Act, 37 the plaintiffs appealed directly to the Supreme Court.
Even though the Court affirmed the district court's decision to
apply the more deferential "intermediate level of scrutiny appli-
cable to content-neutral restrictions,, 38 the Court nevertheless
vacated the district court's decision granting summary judgment
in favor of the government.39 The Court "ha[d] no difficulty con-
cluding" that Congress's asserted interests in preserving free,
over-the-air local broadcast television and promoting fair com-
petition in the television industry constituted "important go-
vernmental interest[s]" for the purposes of intermediate scrutiny
when "viewed in the abstract."4  Nevertheless the Court re-
manded because "[o]n the state of the record developed thus
far," it could neither confirm nor reject Congress's prediction
that the economic viability of local broadcast television would be
threatened absent the Act's must-carry requirements.
On remand, after the parties put "reams of paper '42 before
the district court, the judges again ruled for the government.43
The plaintiffs appealed, and the Supreme Court affirmed. 44 Writ-
ing for the majority, Justice Kennedy found that the "expanded
record 45 assuaged the Court's prior doubts about the reasona-
bleness of Congress's perception that broadcast television faced
a serious threat and Congress's judgment that must-carry rules
constituted a measured response.
A remand for development of the record relating to an issue
of legislative fact in a constitutional case is unusual, at least out-
side of the administrative-agency context. But the two Turner
decisions show that it can be and relatively recently has been
done. This procedure is, of course, time consuming as well as
burdensome on the parties and the courts. Still, to the extent
36. Turner 1, 512 U.S. at 634.
37. Pursuant to the Act's command, a three-judge district court was convened in
response to the constitutional challenge to the must-carry provisions. See § 23, 106 Stat.
at 1500.
38. Turner !, 512 U.S. at 662.
39. Id. at 668.
40. Id. at 663.
41. Id. at 665.
42. Turner Broadcasting v. FCC, 910 F. Supp. 734, 739 (D.D.C. 1995).
43. Id.
44. Justice Breyer, who had replaced Justice Blackmun in the interim, voted to af-
firm. Turner 11, 520 U.S. at 225 (Breyer, J., concurring in part).
45. Id. at 195.
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that it promotes a more empirically rigorous constitutional juri-
sprudence, it might be well worth the cost.4 6 The possibility that
this method should be employed more frequently at least de-
serves careful consideration in a book dedicated to presenting a
"procedural blueprint for constitutional fact-finding" (p. 159).
Faigman, however, accords the issue no more than a passing ref-
erence, and implicitly rejects the approach without elaboration.
More needs to be said before a process combining the virtues of
the adversarial system with the judicial hierarchy necessary to a
uniform interpretation of the Constitution is put out of mind.
B. FACTS' FUNCTIONS
Faigman properly divides legislative facts into the subcate-
gories "doctrinal" and "reviewable," depending upon the func-
tion the facts play in judicial analysis (pp. 46-47). A functional
taxonomy, however, could profitably be developed further. Just
as not all legislative facts are alike, neither are all doctrinal or
reviewable facts.
As to the former, which a court employs in formulating a
governing legal rule, Faigman gives as illustrative examples his-
torical questions relevant to an originalist approach to constitu-
tional interpretation and social-science questions relevant to in-
terpretative claims based on constitutional structure. As he
correctly notes, determining doctrinal facts is a component part
of judicial lawmaking. From this Faigman argues that judges
must remain free to discover such facts unfettered by the limits
of the adversarial process. To be sure, it is hard to quarrel with
the notion that "[j]ust as a judge might retire to the library to re-
search a line of cases, a judge might consult 'The Federalist'
when considering what foundational principles underlie the Su-
premacy Clause." Nor would many argue that a "judge who
reads a biography of Alexander Hamilton or a history of the
New Deal Court" ought not "apply this newfound knowledge to
his or her constitutional cases," (p. 89) though there is something
slightly discomfiting about the idea that results in constitutional
cases might turn on the content of a judge's summer reading
list.47 Faigman ultimately concludes that "traditional notions sur-
46. See John 0. McGinnis & Charles W. Mulaney, Judging Facts Like Law, 25
CONST. COMMENT. 69, 126 (2008) (arguing that an appellate court should "remand [a]
case to the lower court for consideration of a dispositive factual issue that the appellate
court believes was missed or for reconsideration of an issue which, in the view of the ap-
pellate court, needs further evidentiary vetting").
47. Cf LINDA GREENHOUSE, BECOMING JUSTICE BLACKMUN: HARRY
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rounding evidence and burdens of proof are largely inapposite in
the case of constitutional doctrinal facts" (p. 88). In the contexts
he highlights-matters of history or political science-this con-
clusion seems largely unobjectionable.
But, as Faigman notes, doctrinal facts take other forms as
well. In Washington v. Glucksberg,48 for example, Justice Souter
concurred in the Court's judgment rejecting a claimed right to
physician-assisted suicide for the terminally ill. Souter empha-
sized, however, that the Court might reconsider the issue were it
subsequently presented with evidence that such a right would
not create an intolerable risk of euthanasia or coerced suicide.49
Pointing to the legality of physician-assisted suicide in the Neth-
erlands, Souter took notice of a considerable debate as to the
lessons of the Dutch experience. ° For him that debate counseled
caution for the time being. He stressed, however, that "[t]he day
may come when we can say with some assurance which side is
right,"51 and thus he did not reject respondents' constitutional
claim "for all time., 52 In the meantime, though, he was content
to leave the issue with state legislatures, which he noted enjoyed
significant institutional advantages in exploring such questions.53
Souter's opinion raises issues Faigman might have ex-
amined- namely, whether, and, if so, when it is appropriate for
a court to defer a constitutional ruling in a justiciable case be-
cause of the sort of factual uncertainty that proved dispositive to
Souter in Glucksberg. Of course, this question then raises a co-
rollary one about the procedural and decisional rules appropri-
ate in such circumstances.5 4 While it might be tempting to dis-
BLACKMUN'S SUPREME COURT JOURNEY 83, 90-91 (2005) (describing Justice Black-
mun's summer visit to the Mayo Clinic library and dinner-table discussion with his
daughters about abortion while drafting the Court's opinion in Roe v. Wade).
48. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
49. Id. at 782 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment).
50. Id. at 786.
51. Id. For contrasting views as to the lessons to be drawn from the first decade un-
der Oregon's assisted-suicide statute, compare Kathryn L. Tucker, In the Laboratory of
the States: The Progress of Glucksberg's Invitation to States to Address End-of-Life
Choice, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1593, 1603 (2008) (concluding that the "experience in Oregon
has demonstrated that a carefully drafted law does not put patients at risk"), with Her-
bert Hendin & Kathleen Foley, Physician-Assisted Suicide in Oregon: A Medical Perspec-
tive, 106 MIcH. L. REV. 1613, 1614 (2008) (finding that "the implementation of the law
has had unintended, harmful consequences for patients").
52. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 789 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment).
53. Id.
54. Roper v. Simmons is another recent case wherein a disputable social-science
conclusion apparently affected the Court's choice among potential doctrinal rules. 543
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miss Souter's musings as eccentric, the Court's modern constitu-
tional jurisprudence suggests that the only eccentric aspect of
Souter's opinion was its candor.5 5 In any event, this example illu-
strates that not all doctrinal facts present the same challenges to
the legal system. The undisciplined approach to legislative facts
that seems unobjectionable in the context of interpreting The
Federalist Papers becomes more suspect when applied to more
deeply empirical questions, such as the ones with which Souter
wrestled in Glucksberg.
Reviewable facts could likewise be usefully divided into
subcategories. Distinguishing among types of reviewable facts
based on the various functions they serve in judicial analysis
might suggest reasons courts should approach different catego-
ries of fact differently. As Faigman notes, issues of reviewable
fact are ubiquitous in modern constitutional law (p. 98). In some
cases, the result turns on the existence of (or the rationality of
congressional belief in) facts necessary to trigger federal authori-
ty.5 In others, courts question whether intrusions upon recog-
nized individual rights are justifiable as an effective solution57 to
a real and sufficiently serious social problem.5 8 Sometimes judi-
cial discussion of reviewable facts in truth has less to do with
empirical assertions than with judgments about constitutional
values.5 9 Elsewhere, concerns about reviewable facts take the
form of judicial imposition of procedural hurdles for legislatures,
U.S. 551 (2005). See Deborah W. Denno, The Scientific Shortcomings of Roper v. Sim-
mons, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 379, 379 (2006) (contending "that some of the case law and
social science research that form the basis for the United States Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Roper v. Simmons are insufficient and outdated").
55. Cf. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 353 n.25 (2001) (Souter, J.) (de-
clining invitation to impose Fourth Amendment limit on the power of a police officer to
arrest for non-violent misdemeanors in part because "there simply is no evidence of
widespread abuse of minor-offense arrest authority").
56. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005); United States v. Morrison, 529
U.S. 598 (2000); Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank,
527 U.S. 627 (1999); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); United States v. Lo-
pez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
57. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 542 U.S. 656 (2003); Reno v.
Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
58. See supra notes 33-45 and accompanying text.
59. Arguably the infamous footnote 11 in Chief Justice Warren's opinion for the
Court in Brown v. Board of Education belongs in this category. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See,
e.g., David L. Faigman, Fact-Finding in Constitutional Cases, in How LAW KNOWS 166
n.52 (Austin Sarat et al. ed., 2007) (noting that the "question whether the social science
cited in Brown was truly relied upon by the Court has been debated ever since the opi-
nion was announced" and that "[m]ost commentators have concluded that the studies
were a makeweight for a conclusion reached on other grounds").
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the apparent aim of which is to ensure legislative deliberation
about the constitutional question.6 °
The wide variety of functions reviewable facts serve in con-
stitutional cases at least invites consideration of the possibility
that different procedural rules and standards of proof, as well as
different standards for appellate review, might be most appro-
priate in these different contexts. No scholar has of yet accepted
that invitation.
C. JUDICIAL GOVERNMENT
Greater attention should be paid to alternative procedures
for appellate judicial decision of debatable questions of legisla-
tive facts in constitutional cases. But judicial resolution of such
questions, whatever form it may take, still raises fundamental is-
sues about the role of judicial review in our constitutional order.
Most modern constitutional scholars probably take as a giv-
en a pre-eminent role for the judiciary in constitutional interpre-
tation, but not all do.61 The first decade of the twenty-first cen-
tury has witnessed the reinvigoration of the age-old debate
between judicial supremacists and their critics. 62 The former pre-
sume that judicial review provides both an indispensable check-
ing function on the political branches 63 and a necessary means
for settlement of discord between them, 64 in effect producing
60. See generally A. Christopher Bryant & Timothy J. Simeone, Remanding to
Congress: The Supreme Court's New "On the Record" Constitutional Review of Federal
Statutes, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 328 (2001).
61. Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Irrepressible Myth of Marbury, 101 MICH. L. REV.
2706, 2706-07 (2003) (describing prevalent assumption of judicial supremacy in constitu-
tional interpretation).
62. See Dawn E. Johnsen, Functional Departmentalism and Nonjudicial Inter-
pretation: Who Determines Constitutional Meaning?, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 105,
105 (2004) ("One of the vibrant constitutional debates at the turn of the twenty-first cen-
tury concerns enduring questions about the appropriate role of nonjudicial entities-
especially Congress and the President-in the development of constitutional meaning.").
See, e.g., LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES (2004); Larry D. Kramer, The
Supreme Court 2000 Term Foreword: We The Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 4 (2001); Sym-
posium, Theories of Taking the Constitution Seriously Outside the Courts, 73 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1341 (2005); Symposium, The People Themselves: Popular Constitutionalism and
Judicial Review, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 809 (2006).
63. See GEOFFREY R. STONE, ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 86 (5th ed. 2005)
(noting argument that judicial review "rest[s] on the broader ground that the Supreme
Court was accorded a distinctive role as the guarantor of the supremacy of the Constitu-
tion as against the states and the federal legislature").
64. See Alexander & Schauer, supra note 32, at 1371.
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what might more aptly be termed judicial exclusivity 65 or judicial
66sovereignty.
A book review is no place to resolve this debate. The point
here, rather, is that the dilemma posed by constitutional cases
turning on issues of legislative fact cannot be considered apart
from the on-going debate about the extent of the authority judi-
cial review legitimately confers upon the courts. Even more im-
portantly, the prevalence and significance of legislative facts in
constitutional adjudication might have important lessons for the
debate over judicial supremacy, at least with respect to some
categories of constitutional questions. The problematic nature of
judicial determination of legislative facts, reflected in the failure
of the Justices to develop principles to guide appellate courts in
their reception and decision, should be a major consideration in
that debate. To the poverty of judicial procedures should be
added concerns about the severe constraints on judicial compe-
tence to resolve issues of legislative fact. Faigman reasons that,
because appellate courts cannot with confidence rely on the par-
ties to provide sufficient evidence of legislative facts, they must
be allowed the submissions of amici, who admittedly may lack
any claim to relevant expertise and largely escape the rigors of
the adversarial process. He also asserts that, because the submis-
sions of amici will not always suffice, judges must be free to con-
duct their own investigations (p. 100).
Of course one could as easily stand this reasoning on its
head. That existing litigation procedures at best awkwardly allow
for inquiry into legislative facts provides a reason for judges to
shy away from deciding such questions. How might this be done?
An exhaustive discussion lies outside the scope of a book review.
Thus for present purposes it must suffice to list some of the poss-
ible means not considered in Constitutional Fictions.
The Court might eschew standards and balancing tests in
favor of more rules-based approaches that would depend less on
the kinds of empirical judgments that strain the judiciary's ca-
pacity. The Court might more assiduously avoid facial challenges
to statutes, thereby limiting (though to be sure not eliminating)
65. See Neal Devins & Louis Fisher, Judicial Exclusivity and Political Instability, 84
VA. L. REV. 83 (1998) (discussing, and resisting, the arguments for judicial exclusivity in
interpretation of the Constitution).
66. See Kramer, supra note 62, at 13 ("There is... a world of difference between
having the last word and having the only word: between judicial supremacy and judicial
sovereignty.").
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the significance of a ruling for parties not before the Court.6 7
Stricter adherence to "case or controversy" requirements such as
standing, ripeness, mootness, and the political question doctrine
might defer or avoid confrontation with constitutional issues that
turn on legislative facts.68 A greater appreciation for the roles
that other governmental institutions play in the creation of con-
stitutional law might justify reliance on those institutions to in-
vestigate questions of legislative fact relevant to at least some
categories of constitutional issues. 69 With respect to such issues,
the Court might give greater deference to the even implicit de-
terminations of legislative facts that underlie, and support the
constitutionality of, the actions of co-ordinate branches of the
federal government or of the States. At a minimum, the Court's
limited capacity to find complex legislative facts counsels in fa-
vor of greater efforts to rationalize the method by which they are
proven in litigation.
The point is not that all, or even any, of these options would
come without costs, which in some cases might prove prohibi-
tive, but just that they deserve much more consideration than
they have hitherto been given. Such consideration might even
supply an area of mediation between the contending sides of the
otherwise stale and stalled debate setting judicial restraint
against activism. In any event, some approaches might prove
more sound in some categories of constitutional cases than in
others. For example, Faigman appropriately stresses that with
respect to individual rights guarantees the judiciary serves as a
bulwark against majoritarian tyranny (p. 124). In cases concern-
67. To be sure, Faigman explicitly rejects this notion as the product of unduly "ro-
mantic notions of a restrained judiciary" (p. 65), though my point here is that he may be
too swift to reach that conclusion.
68. See generally ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE
SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 115-16 (2nd ed. 1962) (discussing functions
served by non-justiciability doctrines). But cf. Heather Elliot, The Functions of Standing,
61 STAN. L. REV. 459, 464 (2008) (urging, as an alternative to standing analysis, a "vi-
brant abstention doctrine that permits [the Court] to pursue its separation-of-powers
goals").
69. For example, Archibald Cox urged the Court to recognize and defer to the
unique capacity of Congress to effectuate the promises of the Reconstruction Amend-
ments, which not coincidentally expressly authorized their enforcement by Congress. See
supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text; see also David Cole, The Value of Seeing
Things Differently: Boerne v. Flores and Congressional Enforcement of the Bill of Rights,
1997 SUP. CT. REV. 31, 34 (1997); Michael W. McConnell, Institutions and Interpreta-
tions: A Critique of Boerne v. Flores, 111 HARV. L. REV. 153 (1997). But see Jay S. By-
bee, Taking Liberties with the First Amendment: Congress, Section 5, and the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1539, 1624 (1995).
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ing these rights, the courts may find it difficult to carry out their
counter-majoritarian function without independently evaluating
evidence concerning relevant legislative facts.
But not all constitutional cases require the courts to protect
minorities by checking majorities. In important categories of
cases, it is at the least not obvious that counter-majoritarian con-
cerns play any significant role. As Madison famously argued,70
and as the enforcement clauses of the Reconstruction Amend-
ments 7' apparently assumed, national majorities may prove sin-
gularly effective in checking abusive majorities at the state or lo-
cal level. Where Congress acts in just such an effort, independent
judicial reconsideration of predicate legislative facts may be less
appropriate than in the paradigmatic individual rights case.72
Recognition of this distinction might do more than divide the
Constitution into rights and powers provisions, as some have
urged the Court to do,73 though to be sure a focus on the dilem-
ma legislative facts pose for the courts may provide added sup-
port for such arguments. The Court would not necessarily have
to abdicate all efforts to safeguard the separation of powers and
federalism were it to acknowledge that it should avoid doing so
by rejecting Congress's judgment about matters of legislative
fact, especially where the Constitution's framers arguably ex-
pected Congress to take the lead. That legislative facts are espe-
cially likely to be imbued with value judgments may in these
kinds of cases make deference to Congress even more appropri-
ate, if as some have argued, 4 the most compelling interpretation
of the Reconstruction Amendments grants Congress a lead role
in fashioning appropriate remedies.
Lines might also be drawn based on the role issues of legis-
lative fact play in the constitutional analysis. As noted above,75
legislative facts have been made to serve a wide range of func-
70. THE FEDERALISTNO. 10 (James Madison).
71. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5; U.S. CONST.
amend. XV, § 2.
72. But cf Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S.
200 (1995).
73. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 551 n.l (1985);
see also JESSIE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS
175-184 (1980); D. Bruce La Pierre, The Political Safeguards of Federalism Redux: Inter-
governmental Immunity and the States as Agents of the Nation, 60 WASH. U. L.Q. 779
(1982); Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States
in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543
(1954).
74. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
75. See supra notes 47-60 and accompanying text.
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tions in constitutional cases. Judicial dependence upon a legisla-
ture's, or a lower court's, evidentiary record might be acceptable
in cases turning on the existence of facts triggering federal legis-
lative authority. But that dependence might be unacceptable in
cases concerning core individual rights. In any event, these pos-
sibilities deserve study in any effort to provide a comprehensive
treatment of constitutional facts.
CONCLUSION
These criticisms should not obscure the significant contribu-
tion Constitutional Fictions makes to our understanding of the
role legislative facts play in constitutional cases. Prior efforts
were for the most part limited to discrete doctrinal categories.
By devoting a monograph to a sustained and trans-substantive
consideration of the issue, Faigman in effect identifies a funda-
mentally different problem than the ones most prior studies have
examined. The few instances of previous scholarly attention to
the issue as Faigman framed it treated all legislative facts alike.
By distinguishing doctrinal from reviewable facts, Faigman not
only assists analysis of appropriate procedures but also clarifies
the relationship between lawmaking and fact-finding. Others can
now build on that distinction to construct a theory even more
reflective of the full range of nuance implicated by judicial de-
termination of legislative facts.
Faigman drills beneath the surface to disclose that the dis-
pute concerning judicial reception of legislative facts is but a part
of the debate between scientific realists and their skeptics. Con-
stitutional Fictions also demonstrates that judicial manipulation
of frames of reference and paths of proof create both confusion
and opportunities for mischief. Finally, by exposing the inconsis-
tency between the Court's pronouncements and its practice con-
cerning deference to legislatures' findings of legislative facts,
Constitutional Fictions invites efforts to understand this
longstanding tension. Indeed, the book's most substantial con-
tribution may be to reveal how much analytical work remains to
be done.
20091
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THE SOMETIMES UNITARY EXECUTIVE:
PRESIDENTIAL PRACTICE THROUGHOUT
HISTORY
THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE: PRESIDENTIAL
POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH. Steven G.
Calabresi' and Christopher S. Yoo.2 New Haven: Yale
University Press. 2008. Pp. xiii +544. $60.00.
Harold J. Krent
Steven Calabresi and Christopher Yoo's book The Unitary
Executive presents an excellent inquiry into the concept of a cen-
tralized executive throughout our history. The authors' goal is to
persuade the reader that all presidents have viewed the power to
supervise and remove subordinates as central to the very mean-
ing of "executive power" in Article II of the Constitution. With-
out such an ability, presidents would be unable to execute the
law effectively and place their stamp on the administration. The
authors succeed in attaining that goal, for the record they por-
tray reveals a long tradition of forceful assertion of presidential
rights to control policy through close supervision of officers
within the executive branch.
In assessing the history, the authors focus on "the presi-
dent's constitutional power to remove and direct subordinates,
including those in entities like the Treasury Department, the
Post Office, federal prosecutors, and the independent agencies
that some have said are beyond presidential powers of control"
(p. 418). All forty-three presidents (prior to the current Admin-
istration) have embraced a conception of the unitary executive
that at least encompasses the powers to remove and supervise
their subordinates' exercise of delegated authority so as to create
one centralized executive branch. Moreover, an unbroken his-
1. Professor of Law, Northwestern University.
2. Professor of Law and Communication, University of Pennsylvania Law School.
3. Dean and Professor, 1IT Chicago-Kent College of Law. I thank Tom Merrill
and Mark Rosen for commenting on an earlier draft.
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torical practice, in their view, lends considerable force to the
contemporary question of whether the unitary executive ideal is
grounded in the Constitution.4 Their normative view embraces
the unitary executive concept, and they accordingly critique cur-
rent doctrine, in particular, the Supreme Court's decision in
Morrison v. Olson,' for permitting Congress to limit the execu-
tive's removal authority over agency officials (pp. 377-78). To
them, the existence of independent agencies cannot be squared
with the historical recognition of the importance of the presi-
dent's removal authority.'
Had the authors only addressed the removal authority,7
their argument would have been convincing. But the authors
claim to be addressing the entire panoply of authorities that can
be traced to the unitary executive. The authors never delineate
which powers-other than the appointment and removal author-
ities- are critical to the unitary executive ideal.8 Thus, it is diffi-
cult, at times, to ascertain whether the authors present a histori-
cal incident to further their thesis that presidents have
consistently asserted a particular power, like the removal author-
ity, or rather merely to applaud a president's actions.
For example, the authors write of President Lincoln's unila-
teral efforts to prepare the Union for war (pp. 165-69), but it is
not clear why. A presidential power to act outside of congres-
sional will, which they at times criticize (pp. 174-78), seems far
from falling within a unitary ideal. Moreover, they describe at
length the Supreme Court decision in In re Neagle,9 which af-
4. P. 4 ("[A] foundational principle of law is that to some degree what the law is
on the books is determined by what it actually is in practice."). Similarly, to the extent
that Congress or the courts consistently claim a particular view, that evidence should be
relevant as well to the ultimate meaning of a constitutional provision, whether in Article
I, II, or III. The authors suggest that the views of the coordinate branches have not been
as consistent as those of the executive branch. (pp. 16, 28).
5. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
6. In making their case, the authors only touch tangentially on a wide panoply of
other presidential powers, whether the pardon power or the power to serve as Com-
mander-in-Chief. Their book, therefore, does not explore some of the most controversial
exercises of presidential power during President George W. Bush's Administration-the
sanction of torture, the spying on U.S. citizens, and the incarceration of enemy comba-
tants at Guantanamo Bay.
7. The authors largely rely only on the removal authority. Longstanding criticism
by presidents as to congressional efforts to limit the appointment authority would have
bolstered their thesis. See HAROLD J. KRENT, PRESIDENTIAL POWERS 24-36 (2005).
8. In the conclusion, the authors summarize their findings by category such as "in-
dependent counsels," "the civil service," "independent agencies," and so forth (pp. 417-
28). They do not specify, however, which attributes of the unitary executive have been
consistently adhered to by presidents throughout history.
9. 135 U.S. 1 (1890).
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firmed a realm of inherent presidential power in sustaining an
executive branch decision-in the absence of congressional au-
thorization-to detail a marshal to protect the life of a threat-
ened Supreme Court Justice (pp. 221-24).o There is a conceiva-
ble but by no means ineluctable connection between that
decision and the unilateral executive." Similarly, the authors
commend presidents who have asserted the power to construe
the constitution for themselves, but do not explain why that au-
thority fits within their conception of the unitary executive (pp.
69-71, 80, 98).2 The exercise of the veto power, which the au-
thors discuss at several points, seems even more tangential (pp.
95, 99, 135-36, 153, 385). The book suffers from lack of a tax-
onomy of powers linked to the unitary executive conception: a
strong executive is not necessarily a unitary one.
The unitary executive ideal as traditionally understood fo-
cuses not on the relationship between the president and the
coordinate branches but more narrowly on the relationship be-
tween the president and subordinates within the executive
branch. That is why the appointment and removal authorities are
so key under this "superintendence" theory. In the absence of
such authorities, Congress could delegate key functions to inde-
pendent presidential subordinates so as to preclude effective
centralized control of executive authority by a president. The
power of a president to disagree with the Supreme Court's con-
stitutional interpretations or to act in the absence of congres-
sional authorization is beside the point. The historical evidence
10. They add that "[i]t is inconceivable that an administration that endorsed [At-
torney General] Miller's Lincolnian interpretation of Article 11 would not also believe
that the president had the authority to control subordinate executive officials in their ex-
ecution of federal law" (p. 223). The authors simply do not make the case that all who
believe that the president has inherent authority to act to protect the nation, in the ab-
sence of a statute to the contrary, must believe in the power to dismiss subordinates at
will, much less to nullify any actions taken pursuant to congressional direction.
11. Presumably, if presidents can act in the absence of legislation to pursue meas-
ures protecting the public welfare, they can ignore congressional limits on the presiden-
tial removal authority or congressional specification that particular executive branch offi-
cials (as opposed to the president) are to make certain decisions. But, the connection is
indirect. In any event, the authors dismiss Supreme Court decisions with which they dis-
agree, such as Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935), so the relev-
ance of celebrating In re Neagle is unclear.
12. In addition, the authors laud President Wilson for vetoing legislation that
sought to vest in congressional committees a continuing say over executive policymaking
(p. 256). They do not connect how opposition to congressional meddling can be equated
to preservation of the unitary executive ideal. See also p. 155 (addressing Pierce's opposi-
tion to a type of congressional veto); p. 282 (addressing FDR's vetoes of similar congres-
sional efforts).
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presented in the book is thus overinclusive, confusing the reader
as to the scope of the authors' claims.
Moreover, the evidence addressed is underinclusive as well.
For while the material presented to demonstrate longstanding
executive views with respect to the removal authority is impres-
sive, no comparable evidence is presented with respect to other
potential attributes of the unitary executive ideal. For instance,
the unitary executive principle should prompt presidents to cen-
tralize authority through executive orders (pp. 12-13) and
through efforts to reorganize the executive branch irrespective
of Congress's initial assignment of authority. The authors in-
clude mention of these attributes,13 but do not treat them in the
same depth or with the same consistency as the removal authori-
ty.
The authors stress another possible attribute of the unitary
executive principle, namely that the president must have the
power not merely to supervise subordinates, but to supplant
their authority directly. They state that "[a]ll subordinate nonle-
gislative and nonjudicial officials exercise executive power...
only by implicit or explicit delegation from the president" (p. 4).
With that statement, they suggest that Congress plays only an at-
tenuated role in designating the officer to exercise particular ex-
ecutive functions given that the president retains authority to
exercise all delegated authority directly. No matter what powers
Congress assigns to particular officeholders, the president can
make the final decision. Later, the authors repeat that there has
been a consistent view that the president exercises the "power to
nullify or veto subordinate executive officials' exercise of discre-
tionary executive authority" (p. 14). Indeed, President George
W. Bush's administration recently advanced a similar view that
only presidents exercise the "executive" power, and that there-
fore presidents may nullify anything performed by a subordi-
nate.
13. The authors address President Taft's reorganization efforts in some depth (p.
250), as well as those of President Wilson (p. 257), but do not analyze presidential views
towards reorganization across administrations. Interestingly, President Reagan's own
Office of Legal Counsel disclaimed that there had been any consistent presidential prac-
tice with respect to reorganizing the executive branch in the absence of authorization
from Congress: "This understanding has also generally been reflected in the Executive
Branch's acquiescence in the need for reorganization legislation in order to restructure or
consolidate agencies within the Executive Branch." Limitations on Presidential Power to
Create a New Executive Branch Entity to Receive and Administer Funds Under Foreign
Aid Legislation, 9 Op. OFF. LEGAL COUNSEL 76, 78 (1985).
14. See infra text accompanying notes 27-51.
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As a matter of history, there is no longstanding agreement
among presidents as to a "nullification" power. The book itself
provides scant evidence of any presidential power to nullify acts
of subordinates. 5 The authors elide concepts of control and nul-
lification, persuasively arguing only as to the former. Thus, al-
though the depth and breadth of the evidence they marshal to
support a robust presidential removal power are impressive,
their further argument as to historical grounding for a nullifica-
tion power is wholly unpersuasive.
Moreover, the authors overlook a corollary to their unitary
executive conception: given that subordinates speak in the presi-
dent's name, presidents should stand accountable for subordi-
nates' actions. The closer the control claimed by a president over
subordinates-as reflected most clearly in the authors' nullifica-
tion thesis-the more a president should stand accountable for
all actions within the executive branch. In litigation against the
federal government, however, presidents have argued that the
executive branch is comprised of independent governmental ent-
ities, and that each must be sued before relief can be accorded.
Presidents thereby have reinforced the notion that executive
branch agencies possess distinct legal personalities, undermining
the authors' thesis of a consistent presidential assertion of a
power to supplant the decisionmaking of subordinates. The au-
thors-and to my knowledge, nearly all other commentators-
have overlooked that questions concerning the unitary executive
have surfaced in routine litigation initiated by private parties
against the federal government. In short, although Professors
Calabresi and Yoo's book is wonderfully informative about pres-
idential views concerning the unitary executive as a control me-
chanism, it slights the salience of the same theory in litigation
against the federal government. At the end, examining these re-
lated contexts should not render the authors' historical examina-
tion superfluous, but it does suggest that the presidential practice
outside of the removal authority context has not been as uniform
as the authors suggest.
In Part I, I review the book, and highlight the authors' stress
on the importance of the removal power to understand the uni-
tary executive ideal. The authors present a cornucopia of exam-
15. For normative defenses of a nullification power, indeed from one of the au-
thors, see Steven G. Calabresi & Gary Lawson, The Unitary Executive, Jurisdiction Strip-
ping, and the Hamdan Opinions: A Textualist Response to Justice Scalia, 107 COLUM. L.
REv. 1002 (2007); Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's Power to
Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541 (1994).
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pies to demonstrate how presidents have viewed the removal
power as sacrosanct. The very accumulation of the historical ma-
terials discussed strongly supports their view of the centrality of
the appointment and removal powers in providing presidents
with unitary control over the executive branch.
In Part II, however, I suggest that the authors' more limited
focus on a presidential power to nullify acts of subordinates is
misguided. Some administrations, most notably that of George
W. Bush, have asserted that the Constitution vests presidents
with plenary control over all authority delegated to the executive
branch. To President Bush and others, a unitary presidency de-
mands not only the power to hire and fire, but also the preroga-
tive to exercise personally all authority delegated by Congress.
Irrespective of one's normative reaction to such an assertion-
and I have critiqued it in the past 16-the authors' excellent histo-
ry on the removal power is not repeated here. They simply have
not made the historical case for any such nullification power.
Finally, in Part III, I sketch in a more tentative fashion the
previously unexplored implications of the unitary executive in
the litigation context-when the executive branch is defending
itself in litigation against suit filed by private entities and indi-
viduals. Presidents in a wide variety of cases have not hesitated
to rely on a fragmented executive branch to dismiss claims. They
have argued that cases should be dismissed because the wrong
federal governmental entity was named and due to the fact that
insufficient governmental entities were before the court to per-
mit effective redress. They have recognized that federal agencies
have distinct legal personalities. The litigation stances do not
comport with the authors' insistence on a consistent executive
belief in the ability to supplant agency determinations. The his-
torical evidence, in other words, provides a more cabined under-
standing of the unitary executive than the authors and President
Bush's administration would have us believe.
16. Harold J. Krent, From a Unitary to a Unilateral Presidency, 88 B.U. L. REV. 523
(2008).
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I. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE REMOVAL AND
APPOINTMENT AUTHORITY
A. THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE IDEAL
The idea of a unitary executive is neither new nor radical.
The Framers rejected several proposals to split the executive,
and there have been adherents of a strong centralized executive
ever since.'7 The language of Article II seemingly embraces some
form of unitary executive by vesting "the executive power" in a
president; assigning the president the responsibility to "take care
that the laws be faithfully executed;" directing the president to
appoint all principal officers of the United States, and empower-
ing the president to "require the Opinion, in writing, of the prin-
cipal Officer in each of the executive Departments upon any
Subject relating to the Duties of their respective Offices."
To most commentators, arguments for greater centralized
control based on the unitary executive ideal have coalesced
around two virtues: accountability and effective leadership. The
constitutional structure stresses accountability in order to secure
individual liberty. Articles I, II, and III delineate powers that the
branches are to exercise so as to clarify the lines of constitutional
authority. The president stands responsible for all discharge of
policy, and is judged by his or her performance on election day.
To be sure, voters cannot always call the president to account for
one particular issue given that they vote for a candidate based
upon that candidate's entire record. Nor may the president be
able to stand for reelection. Nonetheless, the political process
remains open to air misgivings about presidential leadership and,
as those concerns mount in importance, they may become de-
terminative at election time if not for the president, then for his
party. As the authors put it, the question of control "is not a lib-
eral or a conservative issue, but rather one of good government"
(p. 7). Indeed, Alexander Hamilton noted in the Federalist Pa-
pers that:
it often becomes impossible, amidst mutual accusations,
to determine on whom the blame or the punishment of a
pernicious measure... ought really to fall .... The cir-
cumstances which may have led to any national miscar-
riage or misfortune are sometimes so complicated that
where there are a number of actors who may have had
17. See KRENT, supra note 7, at 12-16.
18. U.S. CONST. Art. II, § 2.
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different degrees and kind of agency.., it may be im-
practicable to pronounce to whose account the evil
which may have been incurred is truly chargeable. 9
Liberty is gained to the extent that one electorally accountable
official stands responsible for such law implementation efforts.
With a plural executive, responsibility may be shrouded, and the
costs of determining who was responsible for what increase.
B. EXECUTIVE PRACTICE
To demonstrate the historical importance of this governing
principle, the authors trace each president's views and actions
reflecting on the unitary executive theory. They focus on a num-
ber of administrations in particular during which controversy
over the president's removal authority arose. Throughout our
history, presidents zealously have safeguarded the power to ap-
point and remove federal officials, despite pressure from Con-
gress. The following is a sampling drawn from the book.
President Washington's administration was critical, for the
first debates over the removal authority arose shortly after he as-
sumed office. The authors argue that Congress's ultimate deci-
sion to vest in the president the removal authority over newly
minted federal governmental positions demonstrates the impor-
tance placed on such centralized control. The so-called Decision
of 1789 has been widely studied in the past, under which Con-
gress provided that the president be able to remove the Secre-
tary of Foreign Affairs and the Secretary of Treasury from office
at will (pp. 35-36). The authors assert that the congressional de-
cision to vest a plenary removal authority in the president re-
flected a constitutional view as opposed to a policy preference.
The fact that the debate was closely contested with respect to the
Secretary of the Treasury has suggested to others that Congress
was far from convinced that the Constitution mandated that the
president be empowered to remove executive officials at will.
The authors, however, focus rather on the fact that President
Washington exercised the same control over the Treasury Secre-
tary as he did over the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and that he
did not hesitate to remove a number of executive branch officials
with whom he was not pleased (pp. 44-45). The authors subse-
quently endeavor to show that the president exercised supervi-
19. THE FEDERALIST No. 70, at 428 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
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sory control over criminal law enforcement of federal laws (pp.
47-52). The fact that private relators, grand juries, and state
prosecutors played a far greater role than today does not un-
dermine their thesis," but does raise questions as to how close
the control over law enforcement in fact was.
The authors also argue that the Washington administration
exercised close control, or at least could have, over the executive
commissions created during his tenure in office. The authors
point out that the apparent independence of the Patent Office
and a federal commission to inspect the mint did not cut to the
contrary and that the president for all intents and purposes re-
tained significant control (pp. 52-53). Only the structure of the
Bank of the United States gives the authors pause, and that
structure, they argue, may have stemmed from a view, since re-
pudiated, that monetary policy was separate from governmental
policy (pp. 53-54).
The authors also focus on President Jackson's administra-
tion, both for his assertive leadership and for his claims of ex-
pansive executive power. In terms of the removal authority,
Jackson was not shy in dismissing officeholders upon assuming
the reins of power (p. 100). Moreover, President Jackson dem-
onstrated a personal interest in law enforcement, ordering ter-
mination of condemnation proceedings against the jewels owned
by the Princess of Orange (p. 103).
In the battle over the Second Bank of the United States,
President Jackson's views of the scope of the unitary executive
became more manifest. He ordered Secretary of State Duane to
remove deposits held in the Bank but Duane, who had been an
ally, refused (p. 108). Jackson dismissed Duane, the deposits
were removed, and the Senate counteracted with a censure.
Jackson then responded that, because Article II made him "re-
sponsible for the entire action of the executive department, it
was but reasonable that the power of appointing, overseeing,
and controlling those who execute the laws-a power in its na-
ture executive-should remain in his hands" (p. 111). He contin-
ued that "it is a necessary consequence that he should have a
right to employ agents of his own choice to aid him in the per-
20. The authors argue that the president, as a theoretical matter, could have or-
dered private relators or state law enforcement officials to drop or alter a prosecution.
Even if true, which is by no means clear, it remains incontrovertible that the president
lacked control over the initiation of law enforcement. See Harold J. Krent, Executive
Control Over Criminal Law Enforcement: Some Lessons from History, 38 AM. U. L. REV.
275 (1989).
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formance of his duties, and to discharge them when he is no
longer willing to be responsible for their acts" (pp. 111-12). The
House, too, debated the issue, but President Jackson stood his
ground (p. 117), and ultimately prevailed. Jackson relied on the
removal authority to unify execution of the law.
Challenges of the Civil War and Reconstruction bring to
light Presidents Lincoln and Johnson's convictions that strong
centralized control was indispensable to effective presidential
governance. President Lincoln's decisive acts during the Civil
War manifested a strong unitarian conception of the presidency.
Indeed, any other view during that tumultuous period may have
stymied his efforts to combat the crisis.
As noted before, however, the authors relate a number of
measures that cannot be ascribed to any unitarian conception of
the executive branch. For instance, they relate that, at the outset
of the war, President Lincoln mobilized troops and supplies
without congressional authorization (p. 166), ordered a naval
blockade of southern ports, and unilaterally suspended the writ
of habeas corpus (pp. 166-67). Many of his actions left Congress
scrambling to keep up.
With respect to supervision of the executive branch, Lincoln
removed his first Secretary of War, Simon Cameron, for insu-
bordination in arming fugitive slaves for the Union Army (p.
171). He also removed from office almost the entire group of
presidential appointees who held office under his predecessor.
Although President Lincoln justly is remembered for his unilate-
ralism and energy in responding to secession, the authors stress
that he also understood the critical importance of the removal
power in coordinating the executive branch.
President Andrew Johnson pursued his own views of Re-
construction unilaterally, but without Lincoln's skill. President
Johnson refused to implement the congressional design to pu-
nish leaders of the secession, protect the newly freed slaves, and
integrate the South back into the Union on Congress's terms.
Although impeachment efforts might have resulted from his con-
tinued efforts to thwart Reconstruction (pp. 176-78), the first
impeachment of a president in our nation's history stemmed in-
stead from a deep conflict between Congress and the President
over the removal authority.
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Congress passed the Tenure of Office Act21 to provide that
all civil officers appointed with the advice and consent of the Se-
nate would hold office until their successors were confirmed by
the Senate. Cabinet members were treated slightly differently
and made subject to the president's removal authority but only if
the Senate consented. President Johnson vetoed the bill, arguing
in his message "[t]hat the power of removal is constitutionally
vested in the President of the United States is a principle which
has been not more distinctly declared by judicial authority and
judicial commentators than it has been uniformly practiced upon
by the legislative and executive departments of the government"
(p. 180). He defended the removal authority not only upon his-
torical grounds but also on the separation of powers structure in
the Constitution: the executive branch must be "capable ... of
executing the laws and, within the sphere of executive action, of
preserving, protecting, and defending the Constitution of the
United States" (p. 181). Congress overrode the veto.
President Johnson subsequently attempted to remove from
office War Secretary Edwin Stanton, a holdover from the Lin-
coln administration who remained on good terms with the radi-
cals in Congress. Initially, Johnson complied with the Act and
submitted the reasons for the removal to the Senate, although he
accompanied the message with a call for repeal of the Act on the
grounds of its unconstitutionality: "The President is the respon-
sible head of the Administration, and when the opinions of a
head of Department are irreconcilably opposed to those of the
President in grave matters of policy and administration there is
but one result which can solve the difficulty, and that is a sever-
ance of the official relation" (p. 182). The Senate refused to ap-
prove Stanton's ouster.
President Johnson a month later ordered that Stanton leave
office. Stanton refused, precipitating the constitutional chal-
lenge. The Senate passed a resolution condemning the ouster as
a violation of the Act, and Johnson responded that "[t]he uni-
form practice from the beginning of the Government, as estab-
lished by every President who has exercised the office, and the
decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States have settled
the question in favor of the power of the President to remove all
officers excepting a class holding appointments of a judicial cha-
racter" (p. 185).
21. Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 154, 14 Stat. 430. Congress repealed the Act in 1887.
Act of March 3, 1887, ch. 353, 24 Stat. 500.
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The House thereupon commenced impeachment proceed-
ings, the primary charge consisting of the violation of the Tenure
of Office offense. The House overwhelmingly voted to impeach
the President. The Senate ultimately failed by a single vote to
convict on impeachment articles related to the removal of Stan-
ton. Thus, although the impeachment reflects a congressional de-
termination that Congress enjoyed the power to limit the presi-
dent's removal authority, President Johnson's steadfast refusal
to cave in followed a long line of presidents who viewed the re-
moval authority as a key determinant of presidential power.
President Franklin Roosevelt assumed great centralized
power, both to combat the threat within caused by the Depres-
sion, and the threat of German domination from without. Upon
entering office he issued an executive order transferring all legal
authority to the Justice Department, and he shifted the Bureau
of the Budget from the Treasury to the Executive Office of the
President (p. 280). FDR, as would his successors, utilized the ex-
ecutive order as a means of asserting tighter control over subor-
dinates on a wide variety of issues.
FDR also jealously guarded his removal power, objecting
when Congress attempted to force him to remove subordinates
because of their allegedly radical views (p. 283). Moreover, FDR
dismissed the Chairman of the FTC, William Humphrey, be-
cause of his right wing views (pp. 283-84). That dismissal
prompted a lawsuit, and the FDR Justice Department argued to
the Supreme Court that the restrictions in the FTC Act consti-
tute "a substantial interference with the constitutional duty of
the President to 'take care that the laws be faithfully executed."'
The brief further argued that the type of duties exercised by the
FTC in no way undermined the need for executive branch con-
trol through the removal authority (pp. 283-84). In its decision in
Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 2  the Supreme Court em-
braced a limitation on dismissals for all executive officials exer-
cising quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative functions, thus protect-
ing the independence of certain agencies from direct presidential
control. Congress reacted by inserting for the first time limita-
tions on removal in a number of statutes (p. 287).
Moreover, FDR sought to reorganize the executive branch
substantially, convening what was to be called later the Brown-
low Commission to enhance the effectiveness of presidential
leadership. The Commission recommended that the independent
22. 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
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agencies be integrated into executive departments so as to pre-
vent their centripetal pull. Indeed, if the agencies proliferated,
the Commission warned that the president's "stature is bound to
diminish. He will no longer in reality be the Executive, but only
one of many executives, threading his way around obstacles
which he has no power to overcome" (p. 293). The Commission
also recommended centralizing budget authority further, and
vesting in the president continuing authority to reorganize the
executive branch as conditions changed. FDR embraced the
Commission's recommendations, but Congress resisted, and ul-
timately handed FDR a stinging setback.
Upon reviewing the first fifty years after the launch of the
modern independent administrative agencies, the authors con-
clude that presidents consistently asserted the constitutional pre-
rogative to rein in that independence. Both through efforts to
reorganize the executive branch and through deployment of the
removal authority, presidents acted congruent with the unitary
executive ideal.
With respect to our most recent president, the authors note
President George W. Bush's assertion of the right to fire any
official with whom he disagreed in the newly formed Depart-
ment of Homeland Security (p. 408). In the face of serious alle-
gations about wrongdoing within his administration, Bush ap-
pointed not an independent special prosecutor but a United
States Attorney (Patrick Fitzgerald) to investigate whether ex-
ecutive branch officials had illegally disclosed the identity of a
CIA operative, Valerie Plame (p. 410). President Bush expanded
the regulatory review program and, in so doing, directed that
regulatory review officers within each agency report not to the
agency head but to the president himself (p. 413).
The focus on the administrations above, however, should
not obscure that the authors evaluate each presidency with ref-
erence to the executive's power to remove subordinates. All
viewed the removal authority as critical to the effective exercise
of executive power. Even the creation of administrative agencies
and the civil service system did not erode presidential assertions
of a robust removal authority, both before and after the Humph-
rey's Executor decision.
23. See Exec. Order No. 13,422, 72 Fed. Reg. 2763 (Jan. 18, 2007). President Obama
has since reversed that Order. See Exec. Order No. 13,497, 74 Fed. Reg. 6113 (Jan. 30,
2009).
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Indeed, the authors take pains to track presidential reac-
tions to the independent agencies. They write that Presidents
McKinley, Roosevelt, Wilson, Harding, and Coolidge all be-
lieved that they controlled the independent agencies and in fact
at times directed their actions, as might be expected before the
Humphrey's Executor precedent (e.g., pp. 234-35, 242, 257-59,
265-66). Presidents Roosevelt and Harding proposed consolidat-
ing independent agencies into new executive departments (pp.
241, 262), and it was President Wilson's discharge of postmaster
first class Frank Myers that ultimately led to the Supreme
Court's broad defense of the president's removal authority in
Myers v. United States,24 a case which was briefed under the su-
pervision of President Coolidge.
Frustration with the expansion of independent agencies
continued after Humphrey's Executor during the administrations
of every successive president. Presidents from Truman to John-
son railed against the notion that the independent agencies were
outside the executive's orbit, and the first President Bush threat-
ened at the end of his administration to remove all nine mem-
bers of the independent Postal Service Board of Governors for
failing to comply with a directive to abandon a position main-
tained in a postal rate fight (p. 389).25 (The courts came to the
rescue of the Service and protected the Governors' tenure in of-
fice.26) And, it was President Clinton who first imposed formal
regulatory oversight over the independent agencies, requiring
them to share proposed rules with the Office of Management
and Budget prior to final issuance (pp. 393-95). In many re-
spects, therefore, presidents even after Humphrey's Executor
and Morrison v. Olson have attempted to limit the ambit of in-
dependent agencies so as to preserve greater authority for the
unitary executive.
Based on this wealth of information, the authors conclude
that presidents historically have believed that they could remove
from office all executive branch officials, whether "independent"
or not, for reasons of policy. They do not clarify further whether
such removals can be reviewed by judges to ensure that the re-
movals stem from policy differences, as opposed to reasons of
spite or bias, and there are few relevant presidential announce-
ments on that score. Nonetheless, the authors make a strong case
24. 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
25. The courts rebuffed President Bush's effort, enjoining removal of the Gover-
nors. See Mail Order Ass'n of Am. v. U. S. Postal Serv., 986 F.2d 509 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
26. KRENT, supra note 7, at 67-68.
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that, without the removal authority, presidents cannot attain
centralized control of executive branch implementation of the
law.
II. ADDITIONAL CLAIMS OF THE UNITARY
EXECUTIVE
Although the book is styled as a history of the unitary ex-
ecutive, the authors rigorously analyze only the removal authori-
ty. The unitary executive ideal should also include, at a mini-
mum, efforts to reorganize the executive branch and to funnel
delegated authority through the White House, such as through
executive orders. The authors note the development of executive
orders and efforts to reorganize the executive branch, but do not
trace each president's actions with respect to these attributes.
The authors assert an additional presidential prerogative
that they claim has been consistently adhered to by presidents.
They argue that presidents should be able to nullify any act by a
subordinate with which they disagree. In other words, presidents
cannot only remove officers with whom they disagree, they can
directly supplant their authority and change their decisions. Al-
though they do not flesh out their theory, they apparently are of
the view that congressional delegations of authority to particular
officeholders are only provisional-the president can personally
exercise that power if he so chooses, and perhaps even reassign
that power to someone else. Without the power to nullify acts of
executive officials, presidents could not be fully accountable for
executive branch administration of the law.
The authors relate some incidents in which presidents coun-
termanded the orders of subordinates. For instance, they report
that Presidents Grant and Cleveland overruled decisions by their
secretaries of the interior, but do not amplify (pp. 192-93, 210).27
They also recount an incident in which President Jefferson's ef-
forts to direct a customs collector to take a particular action
were rebuffed by a reviewing court, much to President Jeffer-
son's displeasure (pp. 73-74). Attorney General Caleb Cushing
during the Pierce administration voiced support for a nullifica-
tion power (p. 155). The first President Bush issued a number of
signing statements protesting Congress's decision to impose ob-
27. See also p. 147 (recounting that President Taylor's administration asserted the
power to direct accounting officials).
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ligations on agents of the executive branch without permitting
his supervision (p. 386).
Yet, those few instances are contradicted by others that the
authors cover. For instance, they relate that the comptroller ex-
ercised final decisionmaking authority over certain disburse-
ments in President Washington's administration (p. 57). They re-
count that Attorneys General William Wirt, Roger Taney, and
John Young Mason all argued that the president lacked the
power to correct "the errors of judgment of incompetent or un-
faithful subordinates" (pp. 142-43). The authors state, as well,
that the Fillmore administration asserted that the president
lacked authority to direct accounting officers in their settlement
of accounts (p. 151). They also note that presidents such as Tru-
man specifically disclaimed the power to direct their subordi-
nates' actions (p. 310).
More tellingly, they omit any discussion of presidential
views as to whether presidents enjoy the power to direct agency
heads to reach particular positions in rulemakings or adjudica-
tions. The authors are clear that presidents should be able to dis-
charge agency heads for policy differences, presumably whether
in fashioning rules or adjudicating cases. That position is contro-
versial in itself." But the authors fail to document historically or
justify normatively the further position that presidents should be
able to nullify or supplant agency head determinations when is-
suing rules or adjudicating disputes.
Indeed, with relatively minor exceptions, the nullification
theory only flowered with the administration of George W.
Bush. President George W. Bush's signing statements and other
initiatives portray a unitary executive that would permit the
president to countermand a subordinate's decision. In President
Bush's view, Congress evidently cannot delegate authority to a
subordinate executive branch official without formally allowing
the president to substitute his own views for those of the officer.
In a sense, the identity of the delegate chosen by Congress would
become largely irrelevant. Congress might as well choose to del-
egate to the Secretary of Labor as opposed to the Secretary of
Defense: they are just stand-ins for the president himself.
2& See, e.g., A. Michael Froomkin, The Imperial Presidency's New Vestments, 88
Nw. U. L. REV. 1346 (1994); Robert V. Percival, Presidential Management of the Admin-
istrative State: The Not-so-Unitary Executive, 51 DUKE L.J. 963 (2001); Peter Shane, Con-
ventionalism in Constitutional Interpretation and the Place of Administrative Agencies, 36
AM. U. L. REV. 573 (1987); Charles Tiefer, The Constitutionality of Independent Officers
as Checks on Abuses of Executive Power, 63 B.U. L. REV. 59 (1983).
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In the signing statements, President Bush objected to a
number of congressional directives that delegate "final" authori-
ty to a subordinate official. Although President Bush did not ex-
pound on his views, he seemingly determined that Congress,
consistent with the theory of a unitary executive, can delegate
such final authority only to the president.
For instance, Congress in a 2002 DOJ Appropriations Au-
thorization Act delegated "final authority" to a subordinate of
the Attorney General over certain prosecutorial training grants
abroad.9 President Bush responded that such delegation had to
be construed "in a manner consistent with the President's consti-
tutional authorities to supervise the unitary executive and to
conduct the Nation's foreign affairs."3 President Bush believed
that vesting final authority in a subordinate officer risked un-
dermining his own ability to administer the law. In the same Act,
Congress vested in United States Attorneys, in the context of
particular civil settlements, "the exclusive authority to select an
annuity broker from the list of such brokers established by the
Attorney General."31 President Bush wrote that "the executive
branch shall construe the section in a manner consistent with the
President's constitutional authority to supervise the unitary ex-
ecutive branch."32 In this most routine or even trivial of adminis-
trative settings, the statement asserts that Congress cannot vest
"exclusive" authority in any executive branch official other than
the president-officials subordinate to the president do not en-
joy independent legal status.
President Bush's objections to legislation directing that he
act through a specific officer reinforces that view of a highly cen-
tralized unitary executive. For instance, in crafting an emergency
preparedness plan, Congress provided that:
If the President, acting through the Secretary of Health and
Human Services, determines that 1 or more substances of
concern are being, or have been released in an area declared
to be a disaster area... the President, acting through the Sec-
retary of Health and Human Services, may carry out a pro-
gram for the coordination, assessment, monitoring, and study
29. 21st Century Department of Justice Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 107-273,
§§ 2002, 2004, 116 Stat. 1758, 1789-1790.
30. Statement on Signing the 21st Century Department of Justice Appropriations
Act, 2 PUB. PAPERS 2010, 2011 (Nov. 2, 2002).
31. § 11015(b), 116 Stat. at 1824.
32. Statement of Nov. 2, 2002, supra note 30.
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of the health and safety of individuals with high exposure le-
vels ... .
To President Bush, the congressional direction that the president
was to act through a specified individual, even though a cabinet-
level official subject to his plenary removal authority, violated
the unitary executive. He stated that: "The executive branch
shall construe Section 709 of the Act, which purports to direct
the President to perform the President's duties 'acting through' a
particular officer, in a manner consistent with the constitutional
authority of the President to supervise the unitary executive
branch." 4 Moreover, in the Foreign Relations Authorization Act
of 2003, President Bush asserted the unconstitutionality of the
provision that "[t]he President, acting through the Director
General of the United States and Foreign Commercial Service of
the Department of Commerce, is authorized to establish Tech-
nology American Centers., 35 Even though President Bush ex-
erted supervisory authority over the Director General, the con-
gressional specification, in President Bush's view, sapped
presidential authority. As with the earlier set of statements,
Congress may not purport to permit an agency official to bind
the president: presidents must be permitted the opportunity to
change subordinates' determinations.
The scope of President Bush's theory of the unitary execu-
tive also is illustrated in his many signing statements asserting
the unconstitutionality of requiring agency heads to recommend
to Congress proposals for legislative revisions. In objecting to
over one hundred provisions reuiring agency officials to rec-
ommend legislation to Congress , President Bush seemingly has
embraced the view that Congress cannot compel presidential
subordinates to make recommendations to Congress.
For instance, in signing the Maritime Transportation Securi-
ty Act of 200231 President Bush objected to a numbers of provi-
sions which
33. Security and Accountability for Every Port Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-347,
§ 709(b)(1), 120 Stat. 1884, 1948.
34. Statement on Signing the SAFE Port Act, 42 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1817
(Oct. 13, 2006).
35. Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003, Pub. L. No. 107-228,
§ 645, 116 Stat. 1350, 1403 (2002).
36. Curtis A. Bradley & Eric A. Posner, Presidential Signing Statements and Execu-
tive Power, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 307 (2006) (arguing, however, that President Bush's
signing statements did not stake out new ground).
37. Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-295, 116 Stat.
2064.
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purport to require an executive branch official to submit rec-
ommendations to the Congress. The executive branch should
construe such provisions in a manner consistent with the Pres-
ident's constitutional authority to supervise the unitary execu-
tive branch. Moreover, to the extent such provisions of the
Act would require submission of legislative recommendations,
they would impermissibly impinge upon the President's con-
stitutional authority to submit only those legislative recom-
mendations that he judges to be necessary and expedient. Ac-
cordingly, the executive branch shall construe such provisions
as requiring submission of legislative recommendations only
where the President judges them necessary and expedient."
Section 110(c)(4) requires the head of the Coast Guard to
"make[] a recommendation with respect to whether the pro-
gram, or any procedure, system or technology should be incor-
porated in a nationwide system for preclearance of imports of
waterborne goods."39 Section 112(4) similarly requires a recom-
mendation "for legislative or other actions needed to improve
security of United States ports aainst potential threats posed by
flag vessels of [certain] nations." Congress did not bar presiden-
tial review of the proposed safety measures. Yet, to President
Bush, these legislative provisions undermined the unitary execu-
tive, apparently by intruding into the president's constitutional
prerogative to be the sole executive branch official to make all
recommendations to Congress.
For another example, in the Department of Justice Ap-
propriations Act discussed previously, Congress directed the
Attorney General to "submit a report and a recommendation...
whether there should be established, within the Department of
Justice, a separate office of the Inspector General for the Feder-
al Bureau of Investigation., 42 Again, Congress did not bar the
Attorney General from conferring with the President before the
recommendations were made, yet President Bush objected. 3
Even officers of the United States had no role under the Bush
conception to make proposals for legislative change. In the same
Act, Congress required the Office of Personnel Management to
"submit a report to Congress assessing the effectiveness of ex-
38. Statement on Signing the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, 2 PUB.
PAPERS 2132 (Nov. 25, 2002).
39. § 110(c)(4), 116 Stat. at 2092.
40. § 112(4), 116 Stat. at 2093.
41. See supra note 29.
42. § 309(c), 116 Stat. at 1784.
43. Statement of Nov. 2, 2002, supra note 30.
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tended assignment incentive authority as a human resources
management tool and making recommendations for any changes
necessary to improve the effectiveness of the incentive authori-
ty. '44 To President Bush, that directive crossed constitutional
lines because it "purport[ed] to require executive branch officials
to submit to the Congress plans for internal executive branch ac-
tivities or recommendations relating to legislation." 45 The man-
datory nature of the provision clashed with his understanding of
the unitary executive ideal. Therefore, he continued, "[t]he ex-
ecutive branch should construe such provisions in a manner con-
sistent with the President's constitutional authority to supervise
the unitary executive and recommend for the consideration of
the Congress such measures as the President judges necessary
and expedient. 4 ' All recommendations to Congress apparently
must be funneled through the Office of the President.
As relayed by the authors,47 President Bush also changed
the reporting relationship within each agency so that regulatory
policy officers would report not to the agency head but to the
president directly. President Bush evidently believed that he
could brush aside the reporting relationship established by Con-
gress. Indeed, a Congressional Research Service Report asserted
that:
[W]ith the submission of the President's FY2003 budget, the
Bush Administration appears to be attempting to transfer
programs from agencies through funding consolidations. For
example, the programs and $234.5 million budget of the Of-
fice of Domestic Preparedness, Department of Justice, would
be transferred to the Federal Emergency Management Agen-
cy.... [T]he propriety of moving program responsibilities and
related funds without statutory authority appears to be highly
48questionable.
President Bush apparently claimed the authority to rearrange
both funding and responsibilities among executive branch agen-
cies.
44. § 207(d), 116 Stat. at 1780.
45. Statement of Nov. 2, 2002, supra note 30.
46. Id.
47. See supra text accompanying note 23.
48. HAROLD C. RELYEA, EXECUTIVE BRANCH REORGANIZATION AND
MANAGEMENT INITIATIVES 8 (CRS June 12, 2002). In addition, President Bush an-
nounced in early 2008 that he intended to transfer the functions of the Office of Gov-
ernment Information Services from the National Archives to the Department of Justice.
See White House Plan to Put New FOIA Office in Justice Department Draws Lawmakers'
Ire, 76 U.S.L.W. 2441 (Jan. 29, 2008).
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President Bush's Administration, however, did not consis-
tently assert a presidential power to supplant the decisions of
subordinates. Consider an Opinion of the Office of Legal Coun-
sel, not discussed in the book, which explored whether the presi-
dent could centralize border control policy to a greater extent
than Congress had authorized:
Congress may prescribe that a particular executive func-
tion may be performed only by a designated official
within the Executive Branch, and not by the President.
The executive power confers upon the President the au-
thority to supervise and control that official in the per-
formance of those duties, but the President is not consti-
tutionally entitled to perform those tasks himself.49
The Opinion flatly contradicts the nullification thesis forwarded
by the authors.
Furthermore, President Bush never claimed the power to
substitute his views for those of an agency head in formal rule-
making or adjudication under the Administrative Procedure
Act.5 0 Congressional directives that particular officers exercise
administrative power are routine. The Secretary of Health and
Human Services, for instance, issues rules and adjudicates cases
that bind the executive branch. In common parlance, these rules,
decisions, and orders are "final." The president can remove the
Secretary from office if he disagrees with the rules promulgated
or the cases adjudicated. If presidents could exercise final au-
thority over rulemaking or adjudication, the very premise of on-
the-record administration action would be compromised. To my
knowledge, not one president has opposed the Administrative
Procedure Act as a derogation of his authority.
My point here is not to engage the authors as to whether, as
a normative matter, presidents should be able to supplant the
decisions of subordinates,51 but rather to highlight how little his-
torical support exists for such a conception. The book's careful
assessment of longstanding presidential support for a robust re-
moval authority does not extend to other potential attributes of
a unitary executive theory, including the power to nullify acts of
subordinates. The authors fail to present evidence of continuous
49. Centralizing Border Control Policy Under the Supervision of the Attorney Gen-
eral, 26 Op. OFF. LEGAL COUNSEL, slip op. 2 (2002).
50. 5 U.S.C. §§ 500-596 (1966).
51. For criticism of their theory, see Peter L. Strauss, Overseer, or "the Decider"?:
The President in Administrative Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 696 (2007); Percival, supra
note 28.
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presidential opposition to congressional determinations to vest
particular responsibilities in particular agency officials. Congress
long has viewed agency heads as distinct legal personalities.
III. THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE AS A SHIELD
In this last section, I investigate, as a preliminary matter, the
possible salience of litigation against the federal government to
the unitary executive theory. Litigation provides an illustrative
context with which to assess the depth of presidents' commit-
ment to the unitary executive ideal in general and, in particular,
to the nullification version espoused by the authors. One can
discern presidential views towards executive power as much
through stances in litigation as through removals, signing state-
ments, and executive orders. Although litigation patterns among
presidents are not uniform, presidential administrations, in a
wide variety of contexts, have asserted defenses in litigation that
compromise the unity of the executive branch. They have ac-
knowledged the separate legal personalities of executive branch
entities, arguing that the wrong government agency was named
or that additional agencies needed to be named before relief
could be granted. Presidents have not assumed responsibility for
acts of subordinates. My goal is not to examine the probity of
such defenses but rather to point out how problematic these liti-
gation stances are when examining the authors' sweeping claims
for consistent presidential assertions of the nullification version
of the unitary executive. No president, to my knowledge, has ev-
er significantly eased the path of adverse litigants for the sake of
burnishing the image of a unitary executive in the public's eye.
A. INTRABRANCH LAWSUITS
In many litigations, the executive branch itself has not
treated the federal government as one indivisible entity. One
such instance has been remarked upon before-presidential ad-
ministrations have permitted, if not encouraged, one agency to
sue another in seeking judicial resolution of a dispute. 2 Such
lawsuits undercut the conception of a unitary executive under
which each official's decision represents that of the president. A
brief inquiry into intrabranch lawsuits serves as an introduction
52. See generally Michael Herz, United States v. United States: When Can the Federal
Government Sue Itself, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 893 (1991).
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to presidential positions in relatively routine litigation that re-
flect upon the unitary executive ideal.
Consider the Federal Labor Relations Authority, which
Congress created in 1978 to resolve disputes between agencies
and their unionized employees.53 The FLRA can rule against
agencies, and it subsequently can petition the appellate court to
enforce an order. So far, six presidents have served since passage
of the FLRA, and none, to my knowledge, has protested that on-
ly he can resolve such intrabranch disputes. Indeed, the Supreme
Court has resolved a number of disputes between the FLRA and
another executive branch agency. If the president can supplant
the decisionmaking of all executive branch subordinates, how
can lawsuits be permitted to proceed without making a mockery
of the nullification version of the unitary executive that the au-
thors advance?
The FLRA cases, as well as those involving the Merit Sys-
tems Protection Board,55 perhaps can be rationalized on the
ground that one federal agency stands in the shoes of govern-
ment employees and thus its position with respect to the employ-
ing agencies is sufficiently adverse to permit suit. The reasoning
may be persuasive as a matter of standing doctrine, but does not
explain why presidents permit agencies to sue one another if
they can nullify the decisions of subordinates. At a minimum,
presidents have acquiesced in congressional schemes that pit one
agency against the other.
The history of intrabranch disputes extends more broadly.
Most famously, President Nixon engaged the courts to contest a
subpoena issued by the special prosecutor. 6 In cases of lesser no-
toriety, executive branch agencies have initiated suit against
each other. For instance, prior to United States v. Nixon, the
United States sued the ICC when it disagreed with its railroad
rate determinations,57 and it later sued the FCC in a dispute over
telephone rates. 8 Moreover, the executive branch has sued to
53. Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.).
54. See, e.g., NASA v. FLRA, 527 U.S. 229 (1999); Dep't of Defense v. FLRA, 510
U.S. 487 (1994); Dep't of Treasury v. FLRA, 494 U.S. 922 (1990).
55. U.S. Postal Serv. v. Gregory, 534 U.S. 1 (2001); Lachance v. Erickson, 522 U.S.
262 (1998).
56. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
57. United States v. ICC, 337 U.S. 426 (1949); see also Ford Motor Co. v. ICC, 714
F.2d 1157 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Department of Defense challenged the ICC's refusal to
award reparations for overcharges).
58. United States v. FCC, 707 F.2d 610 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
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contest mergers and rate agreements that one of its agencies ap-
proved. 9 More recently, two federal agencies overseeing per-
sonnel matters lined up on opposing sides in litigation over qua-
lifications critical for the corps of administrative 
law judges. 6
Perhaps some of the litigation can be understood as a nod to
the reality that, under prevailing doctrine, presidents cannot in
fact control independent agencies but must use whatever means,
including litigation, to ensure control.6' Yet, by permitting its
own agencies to sue others within the executive branch, presi-
dents have perpetuated the idea of a divided executive branch.
In any event, some litigation has been launched between
executive branch agencies that are not considered "indepen-
dent." The Secretary of Agriculture, for instance, sued the EPA
for suspending the registration of pesticides.62
Presidents have, at times, endeavored to keep intrabranch
lawsuits out of the courts, instructing agencies to bring any dis-
putes to the Attorney General for resolution.63 Moreover, they
have defended against suit by independent agencies on the
ground that intrabranch disputes are not consistent with the uni-
tary executive. 6' But, the fact that presidents have permitted and
even launched litigation against agencies presupposes separate
legal personalities of agencies and undermines the authors' the-
sis that presidents have acted consistently with the nullification
65power.
The authors might retort that, until the president chooses to
nullify a subordinate's acts, the subordinate maintains legal in-
dependence. They could continue that, although agencies can
sue each other, the president has the means to halt such litiga-
59. United States v. Marine Bancorp., 418 U.S. 602 (1974) (challenge to merger that
had been approved by Comptroller of the Currency); United States v. Fed. Mar.
Comm'n, 694 F.2d 793 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (challenge to agency approval of rate-fixing
agreement). For a more complete discussion, see Herz, supra note 52.
60. Meeker v. MSPB, 319 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (pitting OPM against MSPB).
61. Even then, the Solicitor General represents most independent agencies in court,
at least at the Supreme Court level. Neal Devins, Unitariness and Independence: Solicitor
General Control Over Independent Agency Litigation, 82 CAL. L. REV. 255 (1994).
62. Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. EPA, 548 F.2d 998 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
63. Herz, supra note 52. Executive Order No. 12,146, 3 C.F.R. 409 (1979). Even
then, the Order does not prohibit resort to courts, but rather only imposes a preliminary
hurdle.
64. For relatively recent examples, see Tenn. Valley Auth. v. EPA, 278 F.3d 1184
(11th Cir. 2002); Dean v. Herrington, 668 F. Supp. 646 (E.D. Tenn. 1987) (exercising ju-
risdiction over the TVA's contract claims against the DOE).
65. Intrabranch litigation is an affront to the theory that presidents can supplant the
determinations of subordinates. Such cases conflict as well with the superintendence
theory, but not as sharply.
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tion. Yet, in the public eye, intrabranch litigation undercuts the
notion of any nullification power and, in any event, the book is
bereft of examples in which presidents attempted to halt intra-
branch litigation in its tracks.
B. STANDING AND REDRESSABILITY
In addition to presidential acquiescence in the intrabranch
litigation, presidents proactively have asserted the independent
legal personalities of agencies as a shield to protect the executive
branch from lawsuits filed by private entities. They have argued
that, if plaintiffs cannot show that their injury is redressable by
the particular governmental entity sued, then their case should
be dismissed. They have refused to be accountable for injuries
suffered due to the combined actions of subordinate governmen-
tal agencies.
The Supreme Court first elaborated on the redressability
component of standing in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife.67 The
case arose out of a challenge to governmental aid for hydroelec-
tric projects in Egypt that allegedly harmed the environment.
Plaintiffs challenged the Department of Interior's decision under
the Endangered Species Act,6" which limited the duty of federal
agencies to consult with the Secretary over federally funded
projects affecting endangered species. Under the regulation,
federal agencies must consult with the Secretary over projects in
the United States or on the high seas, but not over projects over-
seas supported by the agencies, such as one for the Aswan Dam
in Egypt.
For the Court, Justice Scalia held that plaintiffs had failed to
demonstrate redressability: "instead of attacking the separate
decisions to fund particular projects allegedly causing them
harm, [plaintiffs] chose to challenge a more generalized level of
Government action (rules regarding consultation).,, 69 By that, he
meant that "[s]ince the agencies funding the projects were not
parties to the case, the District Court could accord relief only
against the Secretary."7° The executive branch itself had argued
against standing, reasoning that courts should not view the ex-
ecutive branch as one "generalized" entity, but rather composed
66. The prominent exception is President George H.W. Bush's efforts in the postal
service dispute. See supra text accompanying note 25.
67. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
68. 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (1988).
69. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 568.
70. Id.
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of component parts. In its reply brief, the government stressed
that "only the Secretary [of the Interior] is a party," and "an in-
junctive order must specify the federal officers who are respon-
sible for compliance." ' The case was not redressable because the
absent agencies would not necessarily change their conduct.72
Plaintiffs' claims were unsuccessful in part due to the executive
branch's refusal to take responsibility for actions within its con-
trol. 3
The executive branch argued to similar effect in Bennett v.
Spear.14 There, ranchers and water irrigation districts challenged
a biological opinion issued by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
analyzing the effects of a planned Bureau of Reclamation
project on two species of endangered fish. Under the regulatory
scheme, agencies such as the Bureau must determine whether to
abide by the biological opinions of the Service, a separate agen-
cy, before proceeding with planned projects. Accordingly, the
executive branch argued that the suit should be dismissed be-
cause any injury suffered by plaintiffs could not be redressable
by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, but rather only by the
agency that in fact proceeded on the project, the Bureau of Rec-
lamation, which was not before the Court. 5 As the executive
branch argued in opposing certiorari, "Because petitioners' al-
leged injury results from the 'independent action of some third
party not before the court,' they have failed to satisfy the consti-
tutional requirements for standing."76
To the executive branch, it was immaterial that both agency
heads were subject to close presidential control and presumably
reflected the president's views. Rather, the government argued
that no standing existed in the case because all agencies had to
be subject to the jurisdiction of the court before relief could be
accorded the plaintiff. The agencies had separate legal personali-
ties. Although the government was not successful in urging this
71. Reply Brief for the Petitioner at 16 n.6, Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.
555 (1992) (No. 90-1424), 1990 U.S. Briefs 1424.
72. See also Wilderness Soc'y v. Norton, 434 F.3d 584 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (holding
non-redressable Wilderness Society's action to compel the National Park Service to seek
the President to recommend creation of additional wilderness areas).
73. Ironically, Justice Scalia's redressability holding in Lujan undercuts the very
unitary executive ideal that he previously embraced in cases such as Morrison v. Olson,
487 U.S. 654, 698 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
74. 520 U.S. 154 (1997).
75. Brief for the Respondents at 15-20, Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997) (No.
95-813), 1996 WL 396714.
76. Brief for the Respondent in Opposition at 6, Bennett, 520 U.S. 154 (No. 95-813),
1996 WL 33413297 (citations omitted).
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particular argument," its reasoning is telling: in litigation, the ex-
ecutive branch has disclaimed at least one version of the unitary
executive theory for, if all agencies are subject to the immediate
control of the president-and, indeed, are mere stand-ins for the
president himself-then plaintiffs could have received redress.
C. FAILURE TO NAME PROPER EXECUTIVE BRANCH PARTY
Indeed, in settings far more mundane than the standing cas-
es, the executive branch has supported distinctions drawn by
Congress as to which agency is a proper defendant by urging that
suits be dismissed or resubmitted when the wrong agency is on
the caption, or when the wrong governmental official has been
named. For example, in Williams v. Army and Air Force Ex-
change Service78 plaintiff had filed an employment discrimination
claim arising out of her job as department supervisor for the
Army and Air Force Exchange Service. As the court of appeals
described, "instead of suing the Secretary of Defense or the head
of AAFES, [she] named AAFES as the sole defendant., 79 Coun-
sel followed that up by mailing a summons and copy of the com-
plaint to the AAFES, the U.S. Attorney General, and the U.S.
Attorney for the relevant district. Despite the notice, the execu-
tive branch moved to dismiss the case on the ground that plain-
tiff had named the wrong governmental entity, and the court
agreed.8° The executive branch did not avail itself of the oppor-
tunity to demonstrate its unitariness by accepting responsibility
for actions of subordinates and defending suit on the merits.
Many comparable cases exist.
81
Similarly, the government has often moved to dismiss cases
for lack of venue, arguing that the congressional differentiation
with respect to which official is the proper respondent be strictly
followed. To illustrate with but one example, consider the con-
troversial case involving Jose Padilla, who was apprehended on
77. The Court rejected the executive branch's argument in this respect, finding a
close enough connection between the biological opinion and the ultimate relief sought by
plaintiffs.
78. 830 F.2d 27 (3d Cir. 1987).
79. Id. at 28.
80. Id. at 29.
81. See, e.g., State Bank of Coloma v. Nat'l Flood Ins. Program, 851 F.2d 817 (6th
Cir. 1988) (dismissing suit because plaintiffs had sued subordinate part of Federal Emer-
gency Management Agency instead of the Director of the agency itself); Calderon v. U.S.
Dep't of Agric., Food & Nutrition Serv., 756 F. Supp. 181 (D.N.J. 1990) (dismissing case
for failure to name United States as defendant as opposed to FNS); Rhys v. U.S. Postal
Serv., 702 F. Supp. 945 (D. Mass. 1989) (dismissing case for failure to name Postmaster
General as defendant).
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suspicion of Al Qaeda links and then designated by President
Bush and Defense Secretary Rumsfeld as an enemy combatant. 2
The Defense Department held Padilla in a brig off of South
Carolina, and denied him the right to counsel. Through an attor-
ney acting as next friend, Padilla filed a petition for habeas cor-
pus, contesting the continued incarceration and violation of his
right to counsel.
The government responded in part by arguing that the case
should be dismissed for failure to bring the action in the proper
jurisdiction. Although Padilla had named as respondents the
President, the Secretary of Defense, and the commander of the
brig in which he was housed in South Carolina, the government
argued that only the commander as the immediate custodian
could be named as a respondent in a habeas corpus case. Be-
cause the case was not filed in South Carolina, the government
argued that the case should have been dismissed. There have
been numerous cases dismissing habeas corpus actions when the
wrong party, such as the Attorney General, has been named in-
stead of the warder or jailer,83 and individuals contesting loss of
parole must sue the prison warden, not the Board of Parole.84 Pe-
titioner, however, argued that the Secretary of Defense exer-
cised de facto control over him because of the enemy combatant
designation so that venue would have been appropriate in New
York where, arguably, the Secretary of Defense could have been
sued. The lower courts agreed."
On certiorari to the Supreme Court, the government's brief
explicitly relied on Congress' differentiation of functions: "The
habeas statutes dictate, in the context of core habeas challenges
to present, physical confinement, that the proceedings take place
in the federal district of confinement.., against his immediate,
on-site custodian rather than a supervisory official located in• ,,86
another, potentially far-removed district. The supervisor could
not serve in the stead of a subordinate, despite the fact that the
subordinate followed the supervisor's dictates. The Supreme
Court agreed with the executive branch and ordered the habeas
82. Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004).
83. See, e.g., Sanders v. Bennett, 148 F.2d 19, 20 (D.C. Cir. 1945) (holding that the
warden and not the Attorney General is the appropriate respondent in a habeas case);
Monk v. Sec'y of the Navy, 793 F.2d 364, 369 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (same).
84. Billiteri v. U.S. Bd. of Parole, 541 F.2d 938 (2d Cir. 1976).
85. Padilla ex. rel. Newman v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); Padilla v.
Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695 (2d Cir. 2003).
86. Brief for the Petitioner at 16, Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004) (No. 03-
1027), 2003 U.S. Briefs 1027.
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petition to be dismissed,87 holding that Rumsfeld was not an ap-
propriate respondent even though he had ordered that Padilla
be treated as an enemy combatant and exercised continuing "le-
gal control" over petitioner. Presidents have rarely, to my know-
ledge, rejected the refuge of congressional venue provisions to
permit suit against a federal official, even though suit would
have been appropriate against another official over whom the
court had jurisdiction.
Congress's specification of the role to be played by specific
executive branch actors has weight, and presidents have urged
courts to dismiss suits when the congressional specifications have
not been adhered to, even though a different federal actor-
whether subordinate or supervisor-may have caused the injury.
Presidents have missed an opportunity to assert the unitariness
of the executive branch.
D. DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN AGENCY OFFICIALS AND THE
PRESIDENTS THEY SERVE
Moreover, the executive branch has defended against suit
on the ground that agency determinations do not reflect presi-
dential input. Congress in a variety of contexts has set presidents
to review agency decisions, thus suggesting a difference between
agency and presidential determinations. Presidents have ac-
quiesced in the distinction.
Consider the Supreme Court's decision in Dalton v. Spec-
ter.' There, a number of plaintiffs sued in part to overturn the
Secretary of Defense's recommendation to the president to close
a particular military base. Under the Defense Base Closure and
Realignment Act,89 the Secretary was to propose closure of bases
based on congressionally set criteria to an independent commis-
sion appointed by the president. The commission then held pub-
lic hearings and was to submit its report to the president.
The Court held, accepting the executive branch's argu-
ments, that the commission's report was not "final agency ac-
tion" under the Administrative Procedure Act,9 in that the pres-
ident need not comply with any recommendation by the
commission. In other words, agency determinations were not
viewed as actions of the president, but as the determinations of a
87. Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004).
88. 511 U.S. 462 (1994).
89. 10 U.S.C. § 2687 (1988).
90. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1966).
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distinct legal personality. Accordingly, because the president
could not be sued directly under the APA, the Court rejected
the suit. Similarly, in Franklin v. Massachusetts" the executive
branch successfully urged no review on the ground that census
decisions of the Secretary of Commerce could not be imputed to
the president. 2 The executive branch did not consider the Secre-
tary's decision to reflect the views of the president.
To be sure, one could argue that the congressional scheme
itself is consistent with the unitary executive because it vests ul-
timate decisionmaking in the president. But, in so doing, Con-
gress has legislated a distinction between agency and president,
and the executive branch has stood behind Congress's differen-
tiation in defending against the suit. A nullification theory pre-
supposes the potential for presidential intervention ex ante, not
ex post. If subordinates in the executive branch can "exercise ex-
ecutive power ... only by implicit or explicit delegation from the
president," as the authors suggest (p. 4), then congressional ef-
forts to distinguish between the decisions of the president and a
subordinate would be invalid. Every "final" decision of a subor-
dinate would in effect be that of the president. Yet, in litigation,
presidents seemingly have furthered the notion that presidents
and agencies have distinct legal personalities. By acquiescing to
congressional structures that set presidents apart from the agen-
cy officials they control, the executive branch arguably has un-
dermined the authors' claim that presidents consistently have as-
serted a conception of the unitary executive that permits no
salient distinction between presidents and the agencies they su-
pervise. 93
91. 505 U.S. 788 (1992).
92. To similar effect, see also Chi. & S. Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S.
103 (1948) (denying review because Civil Aeronautics Board certification of airline
routes had yet to be approved by the president).
93. Consider, as well, the sovereign act doctrine, which the executive branch has
embraced to excuse contract performance by executive entities. In one of the first cases
to articulate the doctrine, Horowitz v. United States, 267 U.S. 458 (1925), the Supreme
Court examined the question of whether an agency's decision to embargo the shipment
of silk was a sovereign act that precluded a different agency's prior contractual pledge to
ship silk that the government had sold to a private entity. The Court held that
"[w]hatever acts the government may do, be they legislative or executive, so long as they
be public and general, cannot be deemed specially to alter, modify, obstruct or violate
the particular contracts into which it enters with private persons." Id. at 461. The two
characters of government- "contractor" and "sovereign"-could not be "fused." Id. Ac-
cordingly, one agency's policy decision could excuse another entity's breach without ne-
cessitating payment of damages.
Similarly, in Derecktor v. United States, 128 F. Supp. 136 (Ct. C1. 1954), plaintiff had
contracted with the Maritime Commission, a federal agency, to purchase a ship with the
understanding that it could be transferred to a foreign registry. The State Department
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Finally, there are a number of cases in which the executive
branch has argued, and the courts have agreed, including in Dal-
ton and Franklin, that there is no judicial review of presidential
as opposed to agency officials' acts. However, if an agency offi-
cial acts only at the explicit delegation of the president, why
should there be a difference as to reviewability? Presidents
should stand accountable for the acts of their agency heads and
permit review to the same extent as presidential determinations
since all executive branch decisions stem from the same fount of
power. Yet presidents have never complained that Congress has
subjected agencies, but not themselves, to APA requirements
and the potential for judicial review. Indeed, they have asserted
in litigation that agency officials as opposed to the chief execu-
tive should be subject to suit.94 In so doing, presidents have fur-
ther separated their own office from those of the agencies they
control.
A cursory examination of litigation involving the executive
branch reveals, therefore, that presidents in defending against
litigation have taken positions that suggest a stratified executive
branch. Agencies have sued other agencies in court; the absence
of all agencies before a court needed to provide relief makes a
case nonjusticiable; naming the wrong executive branch agency
later intervened to prevent the transfer on the ground that it might be used to smuggle
Jewish refugees to Palestine. Plaintiff sued for damages caused by the breach of contrac-
tual terms, but the court rejected the claim, reasoning that the State Department's em-
bargo constituted a "sovereign act," excusing the Maritime Commission from contractual
liability. As Judge Whitaker retorted in dissent: "This is a case in which this court gives
sanction to bureaucratic action in violation of a right, this time a right acquired in consid-
eration of the payment of a large sum of money to the defendant itself, who asserts the
power to keep the money and to deny the right for which the money was paid." Id. at
142. He continued further that "[n]o sovereign has the power to induce the payment of
money to it in consideration of a promise and then not keep the promise, or pay for the
damages suffered for its failure to do so." Id. at 144. See also Conner Bros. Constr. Co. v.
Geren, 550 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (holding that military commander's order shutting
down base was a sovereign act excusing delay by Corps of Engineers before allowing
construction project to proceed).
In a sense, the sovereign act doctrine can be understood more as a gloss on sove-
reign immunity than the unitary executive. The key issue, after all, is the nature of the
governmental action, and it is immaterial whether the sovereign act stemmed from Con-
gress or a different governmental agency. Nonetheless, the doctrine reveals an instance in
which the executive has gone out its way to disclaim full unitariness: one agency's prom-
ise can be breached by another's policy priority. To the litigant, the executive branch has
refused to stand as one undivided entity.
94. In Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982), for instance, the executive branch
argued successfully that, although whistleblowers could bring claims directly against
agencies for retaliation, they could not sue the president. Moreover, in cases such as Mis-
sissippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475 (1866), they have argued that federal courts can
enjoin agency officials but not the presidents who order them to take particular positions.
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is grounds for dismissal, and agency head decisions are not
deemed to be those of the president. Taken together, these posi-
tions strongly indicate that presidents have staked out claims in-
consistent with the nullification version of the unitary executive
advocated by the authors, and thus undermine the authors' the-
sis that there has been a consistent executive practice in this re-
spect.
CONCLUSION
Steven Calabresi and Christopher Yoo have performed a
great service by exploring every president's exercise of the re-
moval power. They relay the circumstances leading up to the
removals, relate relevant presidential pronouncements, and de-
pict the controversies that from time to time arose.
As a historical work gauging the extent to which each presi-
dent's practice conformed with the unitary ideal, however, the
book warrants only an incomplete. The book is both over and
underinclusive in presenting examples during the respective
presidential administrations. Moreover, the book's assertion of a
nullification power is not even borne out by the examples that
the authors themselves provide, and finds only limited support
elsewhere. Had the authors examined the positions staked out in
litigation by the executive branch, they would have been even
more hard pressed to point to a nullification power in particular,
for presidents widely have accepted and indeed furthered a con-
viction that executive agencies have distinct legal personalities.
Thus, although the book's focus on the pivotal role of the re-
moval authority throughout our history is exemplary, a more
complete historical analysis of the unitary executive remains to
be written.
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ORIGINALISM AS JUJITSU
RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE: THE "SILENT"
NINTH AMENDMENT AND THE CONSTITU-
TIONAL RIGHTS AMERICANS DON'T KNOW
THEY HAVE. By Daniel A. Farber.! New York: Basic
Books, 2007. Pp. xiv + 236. $26.95.
Kurt T. Lash'
I. INTRODUCTION
Jujitsu:
The art of using an opponents' energy against them
The Ninth Amendment3 presents an irresistible mystery. It
speaks of "other rights" retained by the people and it prohibits
interpretations which "deny or disparage" those rights. The
Amendment, however, tells us nothing about what these rights
are or how they can be enforced. On the one hand, this makes
the Ninth rather difficult to apply. On the other hand, the lack of
definitional clarity also makes the Ninth Amendment something
of a desideratum for those seeking expanded judicial protection
of previously unrecognized individual rights. Accordingly, the
Ninth Amendment has been cited in support of everything from
Dial-a-Porn4 to freedom from second hand smoke
The Supreme Court has generally shied away from discuss-
ing, much less relying upon, the Ninth Amendment. It has been
left to legal academics to try and convince judges that the
1. Sho Sato Professor of Law, University of California-Berkeley School of Law.
2. James P. Bradley Professor of Constitutional Law, Loyola Law School.
3. "The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights shall not be construed to
deny or disparage others retained by the people." U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
4. PAUL R. ABRAMSON, STEVEN D. PINKERTON & MARK HUPPIN, SEXUAL
RIGHTS IN AMERICA: THE NINTH AMENDMENT AND THE PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS
(2003).
5. See Gasper v. La. Stadium & Exposition Dist., 418 F. Supp. 716 (E.D. La. 1976).
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Amendment can be explained and applied in a principled man-
ner. To date, the effort has been no more than sporadically suc-
cessful. The Supreme Court, for example, has generally ignored
the Ninth Amendment the last quarter century.6 Judicial en-
forcement of unenumerated rights, however, has continued un-
abated in one form or another ever since the modern Supreme
Court initiated its privacy jurisprudence in Griswold v. Connecti-
cut.7 The right to privacy, for example, has expanded from pro-
tecting the right to contraception, to guaranteeing the right to
abortion' and, most recently, guarding the right to sexual auton-
omy in Lawrence v. Texas.9 Although Justice Kennedy's lead
opinion in Lawrence did not expressly declare that sexual au-
tonomy was a fundamental right, he nevertheless couched his
opinion in language traditionally associated with the Court's
heightened scrutiny for freedoms which should be beyond the
reach of political majorities.0 In one of the more controversial
aspects of his opinion, Justice Kennedy looked to international
law to support his conclusion that laws imposing particular bur-
dens on homosexuals were constitutionally suspect." Kennedy's
reliance on foreign legal sources ignited a firestorm of criticism
from the right and an on-going debate regarding the legitimacy
of relying on foreign law in interpreting the American Constitu-
tion.'
6. The last Supreme Court opinion (in the majority) to invoke the Ninth Amend-
ment as an enforceable provision was the plurality opinion by Justice Burger in Rich-
mond Newspapers Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 579 (1980). The plurality in Casey came
close, but ultimately affirmed the right to obtain an abortion on the basis of stare decisis.
See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 848 (1992) (plurality
opinion). Cf. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 91-92 (2000) (Scalia, J. dissenting) (de-
scribing parental rights as parts of the "other rights" referred to in the Ninth Amend-
ment but claiming the clause is not judicially enforceable).
7. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
8. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
9. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
10. See, e.g., Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 ("Their right to liberty under the Due
Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in their conduct without intervention
of the government. "'It is a promise of the Constitution that there is a realm of personal
liberty which the government may not enter. '[citing Casey]).
11. Lawrence,539 U.S. at 576-77 (citing decisions by the European Court of Human
Rights and amicus briefs discussing international protection of homosexuality).
12. For the political response to judicial use of foreign sources, see American Jus-
tice for Americans Citizens Act, H.R. 1658, 109th Cong. § 3 (2005) (forbidding federal
courts from interpreting the Constitution by employing contemporary foreign or interna-
tional legal authorities not relied upon by the Framers); Constitution Restoration Act of
2004, S. 2323, 108th Cong. § 201 (2004) ("In interpreting and applying the Constitu-
tion ... a court... may not rely upon any ... law ... of any foreign state or international
organization or agency, other than English constitutional and common law."); H.R. Res.
568, 108th Cong. (2004) ( "[J]udicial determinations regarding the meaning of the laws of
the United States should not be based in whole or in part on judgments, laws, or pro-
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Enter Daniel Farber. In his new book, Retained by the
People: The "Silent" Ninth Amendment and the Constitutional
Rights Americans Don't Know They Have, Farber claims that
conservatives are wrong to criticize either the result or the rea-
soning in Lawrence. According to Farber, the Founders them-
selves framed the Ninth Amendment with the understanding
that courts would look beyond the borders of the United States
in determining the nature of the people's retained fundamental
rights. Although not an originalist himself (Farber has criticized
the approach in prior works 3), Farber uses originalism in order
to illustrate what he believes is the hypocritical refusal of con-
servatives to apply their purported commitment to text and his-
tory when it comes to the Ninth Amendment. As Farber ex-
claims, if conservatives do not like his call to consider the norms
of international law, don't blame him, "blame the Framers!" (p.
90).
Using originalism against (conservative) originalists is noth-
ing new. 4 This kind of argumentative jujitsu, however, is a risky
endeavor. Non-practitioners who use originalist methodology
may not be familiar with the most sophisticated (and defensible)
forms of originalism. But even if perfectly applied, originalism is
a dangerous choice for a political partisan.' A historical record
which supports your preferred outcome today may well expand
in a manner that undermines your argument tomorrow. Worse,
having yourself validated the use of history in constitutional in-
terpretation, the inevitable counter-move will be all the more ef-
fective.
nouncements of foreign institutions unless such foreign judgments, laws, or pronounce-
ments.., inform an understanding of the original meaning of the laws of the United
States.").
13. See, e.g., DANIEL FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, DESPERATELY SEEKING
CERTAINTY: THE MISGUIDED QUEST FOR CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS (2002).
14. Examples abound, from Bruce Ackerman's series, WE THE PEOPLE:
FOUNDATIONS (1993), WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (2000), to Jack Balkin,
Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291 (2007).
15. Farber's book has rather obvious partisan goals. From the opening pages of his
book, and throughout the work, Farber makes clear that "conservatives" are the particu-
lar target of his analysis. Just a few examples: The Ninth Amendment is "reviled by
some-especially on the conservative end of the spectrum" (p. 1). There is a "conserva-
tive flight from the ninth amendment" (p. 3). "It is conservatives who should fear and
deny the Ninth-and many do" (p. 3). "For all their talk about fidelity to the constitu-
tion, however, [conservatives] prefer to ignore inconvenient parts of it" (p. 3). "Since
many conservatives do not want to hear its message, they pretend it does not exist" (p.
4). The usual conservative suspects, Justice Antonin Scalia and Judge Robert Bork are
singled out as among the worst offenders when it comes to misconstruing the Ninth
Amendment (p. 5).
2009]
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Also in the category of "be careful what you wish for," Far-
ber's insists that the Ninth Amendment should be read in light
of the Founders' embrace of the "law of nations" and the writing
of early internationalists like Emmerich de Vattel (pp. 6-9).
Here, Farber is more correct than he knows. Members of the
Founding generation did rely on Vattel in their understanding of
the Ninth Amendment, but their use of the law of nations points
in the opposite direction of what Farber proposes. International-
ists like Vattel were particularly concerned about preserving the
retained rights of sovereign nations. A sovereign might need to
delegate away some of its sovereign prerogatives (in a treaty, for
example), but such delegations were to be strictly construed,
with the sovereign retaining all rights not clearly delegated away.
The Founders shared this understanding of the retained rights of
sovereignty and insisted that the law of nations called for a nar-
row construction of delegated federal power.16 In the first consti-
tutional treatise, St. George Tucker expressly read the Ninth and
Tenth Amendments in light of Vattel's law of nations rule re-
garding the strict construction of delegated power. International
law thus informed the Founders' original understanding of the
Ninth Amendment as limiting federal power to intrude upon
powers and rights left to sovereign control of the people in the
states. This is the opposite of Farber's assumption that the origi-
nal understanding of the Ninth Amendment supports federal
imposition of unenumerated human rights on dissenting state
majorities.
After briefly sketching Farber's approach to the historical
Ninth Amendment, I will consider Farber's work in the context
of contemporary debates regarding originalism and the Ninth
Amendment. Moving to particular historical issues, I then ana-
lyze Farber's claims in light of a newly expanded historical
record.
II. THE BOOK
Farber divides his book into roughly two halves. The first
half explores the history of the Ninth Amendment. The second
presents Farber's theory of judicial protection of individual
rights and the methods by which courts can enforce these rights
without reproducing the sin of Lochner, or imposing subjective
judicial preferences on the rest of the country.
16. See infra note 52 and accompanying text.
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With the exception of his discussion of international human
rights, Farber's story of the Ninth Amendment tracks what until
recently has been a rough scholarly 1consensus regarding the
Ninth since Griswold v. Connecticut. According to this tradi-
tional view, Federalists like James Wilson (in his famous State
House Speech') and James Madison insisted that adding a Bill
of Rights might be understood to imply that all non-enumerated
rights had been "assigned" into the hands of the national gov-
ernment.'9 Although eventually pressed into adopting a Bill of
Rights, Madison proposed the Ninth Amendment in order to
prevent any erroneous assumptions about the existence of "oth-
er rights" beyond those listed in the Bill.2" According to Farber,
these "other rights" were fundamental natural rights "embedded
in the law of nations" (pp. 24-25). Although the Ninth Amend-
ment originally applied against the federal government, the same
set of individual natural rights apply against the states by way of
the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or Immunities Clause
(p. 16).
Farber devotes the second half of his book to explaining
how the historical understanding of the Ninth Amendment can
be put into principled operation by the courts. Abandoning the
originalist methodology of the first half, Farber advocates a
"pragmatic" approach to judicial review and sets out a number
of factors that courts can follow in deciding whether to recognize
a new fundamental right (p. 108). Applying his theory to a num-
17. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
18. See James Wilson, State House Speech (Oct. 6, 1787), in 1 THE FOUNDERS'
CONSTITUTION 449 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987).
19. James Madison, Speech in Congress Proposing Constitutional Amendments
(June 8, 1789), in JAMES MADISON: WRITINGS 448-49 (Jack Rakove ed., 1999) [hereinaf-
ter WRITINGS]. As James Iredell declared in the North Carolina ratifying convention:
[Ilt would be not only useless, but dangerous, to enumerate a number of rights
which are not intended to be given up; because it would be implying, in the
strongest manner, that every right not included in the exception might be im-
paired by the government without usurpation; and it would be impossible to
enumerate every one. Let anyone make what collection or enumeration of
rights he pleases, I will immediately mention twenty or thirty more rights not
contained in it.
Remarks of James Iredell in the North Carolina Ratifying Convention (July 29, 1788), in 4
THE DEBATE IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT
PHILADELPHIA IN 1787, at 167 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed., J.B. Lippincott Co. 1941)
(1836) [hereinafter, THE DEBATE]. For a general discussion of these arguments by Wil-
son, Madison, and Iredell, see KURT T. LASH, THE LOST HISTORY OF THE NINTH
AMENDMENT 14, n.4 (2009).
20. James Madison, Speech on Proposed Constitutional Amendments (1789), in
WRITINGS supra note 19, at 448-49.
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ber of contemporary controversies, Farber concludes that much
of the modern Supreme Court's substantive due process juri-
sprudence is justified, though he would expand the list of fun-
damental rights to include a positive right to education and gov-
ernment protection from private harm. Farber closes his book
with a short "Appendix" that briefly presents alternate views of
the Ninth Amendment and explains why they fail to do full jus-
tice to the original understanding of the text (p. 201).
Throughout the book, Farber employs a straight-forward
and easily accessible narrative that is unencumbered by copious
footnotes or detailed analysis of historical documents. Indeed,
Farber expressly declines to engage the historical debate, insist-
ing instead that he has presented "the best interpretation of his-
tory" (p. 5). This approach has the benefit of making the work
far more accessible to a lay audience unfamiliar with this par-
ticular area of law (or indeed of constitutional law in general).
Had Faber attempted to simply summarize a commonly held
view of the Ninth Amendment, his light approach might have
been appropriate. But Farber has a more ambitious agenda. He
seeks to both discredit what he calls "conservative" readings of
the Ninth Amendment and establish a textual and historical ba-
sis for judicial enforcement of international human rights. Given
the current level of debate regarding the Ninth, neither of Far-
ber's goals can be reached without a close engagement of an ex-
panded (and expanding) corpus of historical materials.
III. ORIGINALISM AND THE NINTH AMENDMENT
In the 1980s, conservatives hitched their wagons to the in-
terpretive theory of original intent in response to what they
viewed as the excesses of the Warren and Burger Courts. Bran-
dishing terms like "strict construction" and "judicial restraint,"
figures like Edwin Meese and Robert Bork called for a return to
the original intentions of the Framers." The idea that the Consti-
tution should reflect the intentions of the Founders had substan-
tial rhetorical appeal, particularly for conservatives who were
fairly sure that the Framers did not envision reproductive rights
and sexual autonomy. Restoring the "original intent of the fra-
mers" thus became a kind of call to arms for conservative scho-
lars and politicians alike.
21. See generally ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL
SEDUCTION OF THE LAW (1990).
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The call did not go unchallenged. Defenders of the Supreme
Court's privacy jurisprudence called into question the very idea
of discovering any "original intent." The assault came from two
directions: First, legal theorists argued that determining a single
"intent" was impossible.22 Secondly, historians like H. Jefferson
Powell argued that the framers themselves rejected the concept
of using their intentions as a guide to constitutional meaning.23
Although these critics were successful in terms of discrediting
the search for framers' intent, the ultimate result of their efforts
was to force originalists into rethinking both the methodology
and normative justification for an historical approach to consti-
tutional interpretation. Today, most originalists have moved
away from instrumentalist justifications like "judicial restraint,"
and instead tend to ground the originalist enterprise on the nor-
mative theory of popular sovereignty.25 Instead of seeking origi-
nal intent, most originalists today seek the likely public meaning
of the text as understood by those with the sovereign right to al-
ter or amend the Constitution-the ratifiers. The search for orig-
inal understanding or "original meaning" avoids many of the
theoretical pitfalls of the earlier search for original intent while
at the same time placing the entire enterprise on firmer norma-
tive ground.
A more successful attack on the conservative originalism of
the 1980s came from a group of scholars who adopted the me-
thods of originalism and deployed them against conservative
theories of constitutional meaning. Yale professor Bruce Ack-
erman, for example, discovered the foundations of modern lib-
eral government in the public debates and constitutional com-
mitments of the Founding generation.26 Ackerman challenged
the conservative idea that judicial enforcement of individual li-
berties presented a "counter-majoritarian difficulty" which
called for the exercise of judicial restraint.27 According to Ack-
22. See Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L.
REV. 204 (1980).
23. H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV.
L. REV. 885 (1985).
24. See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION (1998); KEITH E.
WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL
INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2001).
25. See, e.g., WHITTINGTON, supra note 24.
26. See ACKERMAN, supra note 14; AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS
(1998).
27. Compare ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1986)
(presenting the counter-majoritarian difficulty) with ACKERMAN, supra note 14 (persua-
sively resolving the same).
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erman, the Founders established a dualist system of government
in which the sovereign people enshrined their supermajoritarian
will in a written Constitution (higher law), which courts then en-
forced against the majoritarian political process (ordinary law).
Far from being counter-majoritarian, judicial review under such
a system vindicated the people's sovereign authority to establish
their own fundamental law.
By using their own historical commitments against them,
liberal legal theorists were able to place conservative critics of
"judicial activism" on the defensive. One of the biggest conserv-
ative complaints had been judicial recognition of the right to pri-
vacy. Their argument was (and remains) the fact that the right is
nowhere mentioned in the text of the Constitution. In response,
liberal scholars cited the Ninth Amendment, a text that seemed
to clearly vindicate the unenumerated rights approach of the Su-
preme Court in cases like Griswold and Roe v. Wade. Instead of
producing a counter-historical narrative regarding the original
understanding of the Ninth, however, conservative legal thinkers
had literally nothing to say. In one of the most famous exchanges
in modern American -constitutional law, Judge Robert Bork, one
of the top constitutional theorists of his generation, testified to
the Senate Judiciary Committee that he could no more find
meaning in the Ninth Amendment than he could in a text ob-
scured "by an inkblot." To his critics, Bork's refusal to find
meaning in the Ninth seemed to illustrate conservative hypocrisy
when it came to their purported commitment to the original un-
derstanding of the Constitution-a criticism Farber repeats
throughout his book.
In defense of Judge Bork, however, at the time that he testi-
fied before the Senate no one knew much about the Ninth
Amendment. As an originalist, Bork was committed to remain-
ing agnostic about the meaning of a text until such time that suf-
ficient historical evidence is uncovered to allow at least some
tentative conclusions about its original meaning. Since Bork's
testimony, however, a great deal of historical and theoretical
work has taken place in regard to the Ninth. As a result, we are
in a much better position today than Bork was to assess the most
likely original understanding of the text.
THE EVOLVING DEBATE ON THE HISTORICAL NINTH
The first wave of scholarly commentary on Ninth focused
on its text, not its history. This is not surprising given the as-
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sumed lack of any such history and, besides, there seemed little
reason to investigate the amendment's original understanding
given the seemingly facial declaration of the Ninth that there
were other individual rights beyond those listed in the text. The
insistence by some scholars that the Ninth merely restated prin-
ciples declared by the Tenth seemed implausible, given the
Tenth's focus on state powers and the Ninth's focus on the
people's rights. The Supreme Court, however, proved unwilling
to develop a specific Ninth Amendment jurisprudence. For
years, then, a stalemate existed between liberal scholars who in-
sisted that the Ninth had meaning (but weren't exactly sure what
it was) and conservatives who supported judicial non-
enforcement (perhaps hoping the issue would just go away). As
a result, historical analysis of the Ninth Amendment remained
moribund and the Supreme Court turned to other constitutional
provisions in support of substantive due process rights.
It was not until the last decade the twentieth century that
serious discussion of the historical Ninth Amendment reap-
peared. In a series of essays and, later, a full book, libertarian
scholar Randy Barnett solved the problem of liberal application
of the Ninth by reversing the burden of proof. Rather than re-
quiring a party to prove a retained right exists, Barnett read the
Ninth as requiring the government to prove power exists in situ-
ations impinging upon a broad class of individual liberties. Com-
bining the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendment produced what
Barnett calls "a presumption of liberty" against both federal and
state regulation.
Barnett's work not only provided an escape from the Ninth
Amendment's black box of "other rights," he supported his
reading of the Ninth with a close investigation of the historical
record surrounding the drafting and adoption of the Amend-
ment. Taking advantage of theoretical advances in originalist
theory, Barnett embraced "original meaning" originalism and
claimed that the Amendment would have been broadly unders-
tood as a rule calling for narrow construction of federal power.
In a critical contribution to historical scholarship on the Ninth
Amendment, Barnett focused on James Madison's speech
against the Bank of the United States, in which Madison ex-
pressly declared that the Ninth was meant to operate as rule
28. RANDY E. BARNETr, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE
PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY (2003).
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prohibiting any undue "latitude of interpretation" in regard to
federal authority.2 9
Barnett's work advanced the understanding of the historical
Ninth Amendment in a number of ways. First, Barnett estab-
lished that the Ninth Amendment was understood by at least
some Founders as an active constraint on the interpretation of
federal power. Some scholars had claimed that the Ninth was no
more than a kind of restatement of the Tenth-with neither
amendment representing anything more than a passive state-
ment that all non-delegated powers remained to the states. By
highlighting Madison's speech, Barnett was able to persuasively
argue that Founders like James Madison saw the Ninth as an en-
forceable rule of construction which actively constrained the in-
terpretation of Congress' enumerated powers.
In one significant regard, however, Barnett agreed with
prior commentary on the Ninth that the Amendment had gone
unnoticed in any significant manner prior to the Supreme
Court's 1965 decision in Griswold. Even as late as 2003, every
published work on the Ninth continued to insist that the
Amendment had languished in obscurity from 1791 to 1965. The
problem was, every serious Ninth Amendment scholar knew this
was not entirely true. Legal historians had long noted a curious
body of case law, primarily from the nineteenth century, which
cited the Ninth Amendment as working alongside the Tenth to
prevent federal encroachment upon matters believed best left to
state control. This is not a small group of judicial outliers-there
are literally hundreds of such cases extending from the earliest
decades of the Constitution to the time of the New Deal. By in-
sisting that the Ninth had languished in obscurity, most scholars
simply dismissed these early cases as "mistakes." Everyone
knows, they insisted, that the Tenth Amendment guards state
rights and the Ninth protects the rights of the people. Thus, an
entire body of case law linking the Ninth and Tenth Amend-
ments was dismissed, leaving the Ninth to seem as if it appeared
"out of nowhere" in 1965.
But just as the troubling existence of retrograde motion
eventually forced a rethinking of the Ptolemaic universe, so it
was inevitable that scholars would eventually be forced to revisit
this seemingly anomalous body of case law and, perhaps, rethink
the conventional wisdom regarding the Ninth Amendment. The
29. See BARNETT, supra note 28, at 163. See also, James Madison, Speech Opposing
the Bank of the United States (1791), in WRITINGS, supra note 19, at 480.
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latest wave of Ninth Amendment scholarship takes a second
look at the historical association of the Ninth and Tenth
Amendments and argues that courts were not wrong to pair the
amendments for more than one hundred years. Plumbing the
depths of this new debate about the Ninth is beyond the scope of
this particular review. Some of the more recent entries can be
found in a recent volume of the Stanford Law Review where
Randy Barnett and I debate the relative merits of the libertarian
and federalist readings of the historical Ninth Amendment.0 For
the purposes of this review, I will only highlight where the cur-
rent evidence undermines a number of Farber's (and most mod-
ern scholars') assumptions about the Ninth. More time will be
spent on one of Farber's distinctive claims regarding the Ninth
Amendment and international law.
NINTH AMENDMENT MYTHOLOGY AND THE HISTORICAL
RECORD
Here, in a nutshell, are Farber's claims about the historical
Ninth Amendment: (1) Unlike the rest of the Bill of Rights
which reflected Anti-Federalist concerns about limiting federal
power, the Ninth Amendment reflected Federalist concerns
about protecting individual rights. (2) Language which was de-
leted from Madison's original draft of the Ninth proves that the
Founders intended the Amendment to protect individual rights,
as opposed to the Tenth Amendment which the Founders in-
tended to limit federal power to interfere with matters left to the
states. (3) The Ninth Amendment languished in obscurity prior
to Griswold v. Connecticut. None of these assertions are particu-
larly unique. Indeed, they reflect what until very recently has
been the consensus view among legal scholars. Nevertheless, the
complete historical record calls into question every one of these
commonly accepted propositions.
THE NINTH AND THE CONCERNS OF THE STATE CONVENTIONS
One of Farber's goals is to establish a clear distinction be-
tween the Ninth and Tenth Amendments in terms of their un-
derlying principles and goals. The Ninth is about individual
30. See Randy E. Barnett, Kurt Lash's Majoritarian Difficulty: A Response to a Tex-
tual-Historical Theory of the Ninth Amendment, 60 STAN. L. REV. 937 (2008); Kurt T.
Lash, On Federalism, Freedom, and the Founders' View of Retained Rights: A Reply to
Randy Barnett, 60 STAN. L. REV. 969 (2008) See also, LASH, THE LOST HISTORY OF THE
NINTH AMENDMENT, supra note 19.
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rights, while the Tenth is about limiting federal power. Distin-
guishing the Ninth from the states' rights oriented Tenth is im-
portant in light of Farber's ultimate conclusion that the Ninth
represents principles that can be applied against the states. Far-
ber makes two basic arguments in his attempt to drive a wedge
between the two amendments. First, he claims that the Ninth
emerged out of Federalist concerns about individual rights (p.
37), not Anti-Federalist concerns about limiting federal power.
Second, Farber argues that Madison's original intent to place the
clauses in different sections of the Constitution illustrates how
the Amendments had different purposes and goals.
Farber's first claim is that "the Ninth Amendment was the
product of Madison's mind" (p. 209). Other scholars have made
similar claims. Leonard Levy, for example, asserts that unlike
the rest of the Bill of Rights which are rooted in proposals made
by the state ratifying conventions, the language of the Ninth
Amendment was the unique idea of James Madison alone.3"
While this is true of the final language of the Ninth, Madison's
original proposal echoed language suggested by a number of
state conventions, Virginia's proposed amendments in particular
(which Madison helped draft).32 Madison's original draft of the
Ninth and Tenth Amendment also both addressed the same
general subject: The need to limit federal power. Here are Madi-
son's original drafts of both Amendments:
The exceptions, here or elsewhere in the Constitution, made
in favor of particular rights, shall not be so construed as to
diminish the just importance of other rights retained by the
people, or as to enlarge the powers delegated by the Constitu-
tion; but either as actual limitations of such powers, or as in-
serted merely for greater caution.33
The powers not delegated by this Constitution, nor prohibited
by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively.
34
Madison's Tenth has the effect of limiting the federal govern-
ment to delegated powers (unlike the general police powers of
the states). The Ninth forbids undue "enlargement" of those de-
31. See, e.g., LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 247 (1999)
(Madison "improvised [the Ninth Amendment]. No precise precedent for it existed.").
32. Scholars have long noticed the link between Madison's original draft and pro-
posals from Virginia and New York. For a discussion of these proposals, see Kurt T.
Lash, The Inescapable Federalism of the Ninth Amendment, 93 IOWA L. REV. 801(2008).
33. Madison, supra note 19, at 443.
34. Id. at 444.
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legated powers. The original draft of the Amendments thus ad-
dressed the same general goal, limiting national power. This not
only links the original purposes of the Ninth and Tenth
Amendments, it also ties them to the concerns of the state con-
ventions. Limiting federal power, of course, was more of a con-
cern to the doubters in the state conventions than the Federalist
proponents of the Constitution.
Farber's second claim involves Madison's original intended
placement of the two amendments. Madison had originally pro-
posed placing the Ninth Amendment with the other amend-
ments addressing individual rights, while placing the Tenth in
Article VI. Farber believes that Madison's intended separation
of the two amendments indicates the clauses originally had dif-
ferent purposes: The Tenth was about federalism while the
Ninth "was about individual rights" (p. 44).35
Here Farber makes an assumption about Madison's intent
based on his original planned placement of the amendments. But
there is no need in this case to try and guess Madison's views
about the relationship between the Ninth and Tenth Amend-
ments." The man is on record as declaring, in both private letters
and public speeches, that the Ninth and Tenth Amendments
worked together to protect the reserved powers and rights of the
states.36 Farber does not mention Madison's explanations, both
delivered while ratification of the Bill of Rights remained pend-
ing in the states. It is possible that Farber follows some histo-
rians in distinguishing between the "early" and "later" views of
Madison, with the former taking a more nationalist view of fed-
eral power and rights and the latter taking more of a (post hoc)
states rights approach in response to the nationalist policies of
Alexander Hamilton and John Adams.37 This bifurcated view of
Madison generally attempts to distinguish the Madison who fa-
thered the Constitution with the Madison who later advocated a
rule of strict construction of federal power. Modern biographers
of Madison, however, stress the remarkable consistency in Madi-
35. The Founders do not seem to have shared Farber's clean distinction between
limiting federal power (federalism) and protecting individual rights. For example, James
Madison claimed that the Sedition Act violated both individual rights and the rights of
states. See generally, Kurt T. Lash, James Madison's Celebrated report of 1800: The
Transformation of the Tenth Amendment, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 165, 181 (2006).
36. See Madison, supra note 29.
37. There are places in Farber's book where he appears to take this "early v. late"
view of Madison's work. (e.g., p. 46: "In their reaction against Hamilton and the Federal-
ist Part's platform, Southerners like Jefferson and Madison developed a constitutional
theory that stressed states' rights and strict construction of federal power.").
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son's thinking from the end of the Philadelphia Convention
through his 1790s battles with the nationalist policies of men like
Alexander Hamilton.38 Indeed, Madison adopted a mixed view
of the Constitution (both federal and national) throughout his
life, for he fought as hard against ultranationalists like Hamilton
as he did against ultra-states' rights theorists like Spencer Roane
and John C. Calhoun.39
But even accepting the theory of the "two Madison's," one
still cannot dismiss his declarations regarding the Ninth and
Tenth Amendments. Madison's Virginia Resolutions were in-
deed a response to the aggressive nationalist policies of the Fe-
deralist Party, and they were written a decade after the adoption
of the Constitution. But Madison's declarations regarding the
Ninth and Tenth Amendment were written in 1791, even before
the adoption of the Bill of Rights. In short, not only do we know
Madison's views of the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, he de-
clared those views, more than once, before the ink on the origi-
nal Constitution was dry.
Putting aside for the moment the issue of Madison's per-
sonal intentions, by stressing the original proposed placement of
the two amendments, Farber relies on an outmoded form of ori-
ginalism. At most, Madison's placement proposal might tell us
something of Madison's original private intentions regarding the
two provisions. Contemporary originalists, however, do not seek
the private intentions of the Framers. Instead, the effort is to re-
cover the original public meaning of the text as it was unders-
tood by the ratifiers, the body with the sovereign authority to es-
tablish fundamental law. This shift in methodology reflects a
shift in the normative justification for using original meaning as
an interpretive method. Although presented in the past as a tool
for constraining judicial activism, today the practitioners of ori-
ginalism most often justify their efforts on the normative theory
of popular sovereignty-the sovereign right of the people to es-
tablish fundamental law in a written and enforceable Constitu-
tion. 40 The relevant group in this endeavor is not the individual
framers (and their private intentions), but the members of the
ratifying assemblies who debated and adopted the text. This
38. See, e.g., RALPH KETCHAM, JAMES MADISON: A BIOGRAPHY 323 (1990).
39. Farber himself has discussed the "mixed" position of Madison regarding state
and national power in other works. See DANIEL FARBER, LINCOLN'S CONSTITUTION 39
(2003) [hereinafter FARBER, LINCOLN'S CONSTITUTION].
40. For the sophisticated (and complete) analysis of popular sovereignty based ori-
ginalism, see WHITTINGTON, supra note 24.
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group would not have known about Madison's original place-
ment of the two amendments. Instead, they were presented with
a single "Bill," with the Ninth and Tenth Amendments placed
side by side.
THE ALTERED LANGUAGE
Two critical changes occurred between the time Madison
presented his proposed amendments and when Congress pre-
sented the Bill of Rights to the states. First, as discussed above,
the Amendments were consolidated into a single Bill to be add-
ed at the end of the original Constitution. Secondly, Madison's
original language regarding the Ninth was trimmed. The final
draft of the Ninth omitted the original language regarding feder-
al power and focused solely on the issue of the retained rights of
the people. Farber claims that this alteration proves that the final
draft addressed only individual rights and had nothing to do with
limiting federal power." This is a common claim among those
who read the amendment as only protecting individual rights.
From a modern perspective, this assertion seems reasonable
enough-language referring to the rights of the people seems
unrelated to limiting the construction of federal power. But, as
the writings of James Madison make clear, such was not the case
at the Founding. In a letter discussing the Ninth Amendment
that Farber does not address, Madison explained that protecting
rights and limiting the construction of power amount to the same
thing.
If a line can be drawn between the powers granted and the
rights retained, it would seem to be the same thing, whether
the latter be secured by declaring that they shall not be ab-
ridged, or that the former shall not be extended.2
To Madison, limiting powers and protecting retained rights were
two sides of the same coin: accomplishing one goal, by defini-
tion, accomplished the other. Madison's letter was written in re-
41. According to Farber:
[N]otice the deleted language saying that enumerated rights do not indirectly
expand other federal powers. The deletion of this language is significant be-
cause it disproves one misreading of the Ninth Amendment, which tries to twist
it into an effort to restrict federal powers rather than to recognize unenume-
rated rights. If the idea was to restrict federal power, that language was there as
part of Madison's draft. The fact that this specific language was deleted shows
that the remaining language had a different purpose (p. 42).
42. Letter from James Madison to George Washington (Dec. 5, 1789), in 5 THE
DEBATE, supra note 19, at 221-22.
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sponse to objections raised in the Virginia Assembly that the fi-
nal draft of the Ninth did not containing language clearly limit-
ing the construction of federal power. According to Madison,
the objection was "fanciful" for language guarding retained
rights had the same effect as language limiting the construction
of federal power-only the language used the more powerful
concept of rights. Advocates of a libertarian reading of the Ninth
have struggled to explain (or discredit or ignore) this letter by
Madison. Recently, however, new evidence has come to light
regarding the subject of Madison's letter, objections in the Vir-
ginia assembly regarding the final draft. This new evidence
makes clear (if the letter was not itself clear enough) that Madi-
son believed the final version of the Ninth Amendment ad-
dressed the Virginia Assembly's concerns about the need to lim-
it federal power. Hardin Burnley, a member of the assembly
charged with debating and ratifying the Bill, shared the same
view.
Farber insists that it is a mistake to read the Ninth as limit-
ing federal power. But not only does he ignore Madison's (and
Burnley's) letter on the subject, he also ignores Madison's 1791
speech against the Bank of the United States, in which Madison
publically declares that the Ninth Amendment guards against a
"latitude of interpretation" in matters involving federal intrusion
upon the autonomy of the states. This speech is particularly im-
portant as signaled to the Virginia ratifying assembly the mean-
ing of the Ninth Amendment according to Virginia's congres-
sional delegate and drafter of the clause.
THE MYTH OF THE HISTORICAL OBSCURITY OF THE NINTH
AMENDMENT
One of the most common assertions about the Ninth
Amendment is that it disappeared from view following its adop-
tion until resurrected by Justices Douglas and Goldberg in Gris-
wold v. Connecticut. According to Farber, following its enact-
ment, the Ninth Amendment "faded from view" (p. 46).
Although one of the most common assertions about the Ninth, it
is also one of most easily, and conclusively, disproved. Else-
where, I have compiled a fairly exhaustive list of post-adoption
cases and commentary on the Ninth Amendment. 4 Without
43. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, The Ninth Amendment: It Means What It Says, 85
TEX. L. REv. 1, 54 (2006).
44. See Lash, supra note 19; Kurt T. Lash, The Lost Jurisprudence of the Ninth
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going into detail here, suffice to say that courts and commenta-
tors repeatedly referred to the Ninth Amendment throughout
the first century and a half of the Constitution. Highlights in-
clude Madison's letters and speeches, the first constitutional
treatise, St. George Tucker's View of the Constitution,45 Justice
Story's Supreme Court opinion in Houston v. Moore,46 and liter-
ally hundreds of state and federal judicial opinions.47 The myth
of the "forgotten Ninth Amendment" is so easily disproven that
its continued reference in the literature raises an issue of its own.
What can account for this myth's durability?
The primary reason, I believe, is the fact that almost all of
these numerous historical references to the Ninth occur in con-
junction with discussions of the Tenth Amendment and the need
to limit federal power. Beginning with Bennett Patterson's 1955
"The Forgotten Ninth Amendment," 48 modern Ninth Amend-
ment scholars (including Farber) simply dismiss as "mistaken"
any historical reference that links the Ninth and Tenth Amend-
ments.49 Given the sheer number of reference accordingly dis-
missed from consideration, this is a rather bold assumption.
Nevertheless, if one first assumes that the Ninth and Tenth have
nothing to do with one another, then it simply follows that any
historical evidence to the contrary must be in error. The problem
is with the assumption.
Again, this is not the place to fully investigate the full his-
torical record of the Ninth Amendment. My purpose is only to
alert readers to the existence of a number of historical docu-
ments that call into question Farber's reliance on Ninth
Amendment mythology. Farber could have addressed this
record and no doubt advanced our understanding of a develop-
ing historical record, as indeed he has done in prior works.0 Un-
fortunately Farber simply avoids the current debate. Although
readers are promised a more developed historical discussion in
the book's "Appendix" (p. 201), this final section of the book
Amendment, 83 TEX. L. REV. 597 (2005) [hereinafter Lash, Lost Jurisprudence].
45. St. George Tucker, Note D: View of the Constitution of the United States, in 1
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 140 (Dennis & Co., Inc. 1965) (1803).
46. 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1 (1820).
47. See Lash, Lost Jurisprudence, supra note 44.
48. BENNETT B. PATTERSON, THE FORGOTTEN NINTH AMENDMENT: A CALL FOR
LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL RECOGNITION OF RIGHTS UNDER SOCIAL CONDITIONS OF
TODAY (1955).
49. P. 46: "When it was mentioned at all, the ninth was often erroneously lumped
together with the tenth amendment (which preserves the 'powers retained by the
states')".
50. See FARBER, LINCOLN'S CONSTITUTION, supra note 39.
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provides only a cursory sketch and dismissal of various alterna-
tive interpretations of the Ninth Amendment.
THE LAW OF NATIONS, POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY, AND THE
NINTH AMENDMENT
In some ways, Farber is absolutely right to insist we consid-
er the Founders' view of the law of nations in determining the
original meaning of the Ninth Amendment.51 In particular, Far-
ber correctly identifies the work of the eighteenth century inter-
nationalist Emmerich de Vattel as influencing the Founding
generations' understanding of the retained rights of the people.
The earliest constitutional treatise, St. George Tucker's 1803
View of the Constitution, cites Vattel's Le Droit des Gens ("The
Law of Nations") throughout, especially in regard to the Ninth
and Tenth Amendments.52 But where Farber is concerned about
retained individual rights, Vattel was most concerned with the
retained rights of the sovereign. The distinction is critical in un-
derstanding how international law informed the meaning of the
Ninth Amendment.
Although most Ninth Amendment scholarship focuses on
the issue of individual natural rights, the text of the Ninth
Amendment is not so limited. It speaks of "other rights," not
just other individual rights, much less individual natural rights.
At the time of the Founding, rights came in many different
shapes and sizes: individual and collective, natural and positive.
Nothing in the text of the Ninth Amendment excludes any cate-
gory of right. For example, the people could retain the right to
free expression (an individual natural right) or the collective
right to determine municipal law (such as local piloting regula-
tions) on a local level. It takes but a moment's thought to realize
that "the people" (whether conceived of a single national people
or the people in the several states, or both) would have wanted
to retain under local control all those rights, whether individual
and collective, which were not delegated into the hands of the
national government. Madison was clear about this: In his
speech against the Bank of the United States, Madison claimed
that because chartering a bank was not within the delegated
powers of Congress, passing the Bank Bill would violate the
Ninth and Tenth Amendments. The Bill would not violate indi-
51. Justices who "look[] beyond our national borders to seek the parameters of li-
berty ... honor the framers' intent" (p. 10).
52. See, e.g., Tucker, supra note 45, at 151.
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vidual natural rights (there was no right of people in the states to
prevent state chartered banks-indeed, most states had them).
Instead, the Bill would violate what Madison saw as a retained
right of the collective people in the several states.
In this way, the Ninth and Tenth Amendments preserved
the Founding vision of popular sovereignty. A concept rooted in
the English Bill of Rights, but which evolved significantly in Re-
volutionary America, popular sovereignty maintains that sove-
reign power resides in the collective people and not in their gov-
ernment. Locating sovereignty in extra-governmental
conventions of the people was a key development along the road
to the American embrace of written and enforceable constitu-
tions. Prior to the adoption of the federal Constitution, of
course, the people existed in separate sovereign states (the "free
and independent states" of the Declaration of Independence).
One of the major issues which arose during the ratification de-
bates involved whether the people in the states would continue
in their independent sovereign capacity, or whether they would
be consolidated into a single national "people." In order to se-
cure ratification, the Federalists assured the conventions that no
such consolidation would occur. As Madison assured the ratifi-
ers in the Federalist Papers, the Constitution was neither wholly
national nor wholly federal-each would have its independent
and respective powers, jurisdictions, and rights following ratifica-
tion.
The problem for those still on the fence regarding the pro-
posed Constitution, however, was the possibility that delegated
federal power would be so broadly construed as to render the
independent sovereignty of the people in the states no more
than a paper declaration. Once again, Federalists such as James
Madison, Alexander Hamilton and James Wilson insisted that
the federal government would have only expressly delegated
powers, and that these powers would be strictly construed. As
Hamilton pointed out, strict construction of delegated sovereign
power was the established "law of nations."
According to Vattel, the acknowledged expert on interna-
tional law, sovereigns (be they Kings or a sovereign people)
were assumed to never delegate away any more of their sove-
reign powers than was necessary to accomplish a particular pur-
pose. Accordingly, delegated sovereign authority was read to in-
clude only those powers expressly enumerated or "clearly"
2009]
HeinOnline -- 25 Const. Comment. 539 2008-2009
540 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 25:521
incident to the express delegation. 3 In the first constitutional
treatise, St. George Tucker applied Vattel's law of nations to the
specific issue of delegated federal power. A passionate defender
of popular sovereignty, Tucker insisted that because the sove-
reign people in the several states had previously delegated broad
powers to their state governments, establishing a new federal
government required the people to recall some of these powers
and delegate them into the hands of the national government.
Citing Vattel, Tucker insisted that all such newly delegated pow-
er must be strictly construed, and that this principle of the law of
nations had been constitutionally enshrined through the adop-
tion of the Ninth and Tenth Amendments. John Overton, a
member of the second North Carolina Ratifying Convention
that ratified the Ninth Amendment, similarly viewed the Ninth
as working alongside the Tenth to preserve the retained state
right of "self-preservation." Writing as a judge on the Tennessee
bench, Overton declared:
[N]ations as well as individuals are tenacious of the rights of
self-preservation, of which, as applied to sovereign States, the
right of soil or eminent domain is one. Constitutions, treaties,
or laws, in derogation of these rights are to be construed
strictly. Vattel is of this opinion, and, what is more satisfactory,
the Federalist, and the American author of the Notes to
Blackstone's Commentaries, two of the most eminent writers
on jurisprudence, are of the same opinion [Here Judge Over-
ton cites Vattel, Tucker's discussion of the Ninth and Tenth
Amendments, as well as the amendments themselves].54
James Madison shared the same view-the people in the states
had been promised strict construction of federal power-a
promise made express in the final two amendments in the Bill of
Rights. The above does not mean that Farber (and others) are
wrong to insist the Ninth protects individual natural rights. To
the contrary, it is clear that the state conventions (and Founders
like Madison) were very much concerned about protecting such
rights. The issue involves how such rights were to be protected,
as well as other rights which also were considered among the re-
tained rights of the people. For example, the Free Speech Clause
53. In other works, Farber seems aware of this aspect of Vattel's writing. See
FARBER, LINCOLN'S CONSTITUTION, supra note 39, at 33.
54. Glasgow's Lessee v. Smith, 1 Tenn. (1 Overt.) 144, 166 (1799) (Overton, J.) (cit-
ing "vat. B. 2 c, 17, §§ 305, 308; Amendment to Con. U. S. arts 11, 12; 1 T. BI. app. to part
1, 307. 308: lb. 412; Vat. B. 1, c., § 10; 2 Dal. 384; 1 T. BI. app. to part 1, 269; 4 Johns.
163").
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of the first amendment protected what Madison referred to as an
individual natural right. This right was protected, however, by
leaving regulation of speech to the people in the individual
states. Thus, when the national government passed the Sedition
Law, Madison objected that the law violated both the First and
Tenth Amendments.55 The same was true of the retained rights
of the Ninth Amendment: these rights, be they individual or col-
lective, were retained under the control of the people in the sev-
eral states who could then leave the matter under the control of
their state government, or retain the right from their state gov-
ernment as well by placing the matter in their state declaration
of rights. The Ninth and Tenth Amendment ensured these re-
tained rights of local self-government by limiting the federal
government to delegated power (the Tenth Amendment) and
requiring the strict construction of those powers which were de-
legated.
When Farber sees Founding-era references to retained
rights and the law of nations, he reads these phrases through the
lens of modern libertarian human rights law. For Vattel and
those Founders who applied his work to the new Constitution,
the emphasis was on the law of nations-how sovereignties re-
late to one another and the proper construction of delegated
power. In fact, because Vattel's work powerfully supported strict
construction of the Constitution, later nationalists like Joseph
Story went out of their way to denounce reliance on "Euro-
peans" like Vattel. Ironically, it was nationalists like Story and
John Marshall who supplied the vision of national power that
would ultimately be used to justify the New Deal Court's expan-
sion of federal authority-a result that Farber appears to ap-
plaud. But these same nineteenth century nationalists rejected
reliance on international law precisely because the law of nations
called for a narrow construction of federal power. One can em-
brace broad theories of federal power, or one can embrace Vat-
tel's contributions to the American theory of the people's re-
tained rights. One cannot, however, embrace them both. Thus,
when Farber argues in favor of both New Deal regulatory power
and enforcement of international human rights law against the
states,56 he has doubly departed from the original vision of the
Ninth Amendment.
55. See James Madison, Virginia Resolutions Against the Alien and Sedition Acts
(1798), in WRITINGS, supra note 19, at 590-91.
56. See p. 209 (criticizing the libertarian view as unduly encroaching on federal
power), and pp. 96-97 (arguing against economic rights as fundamental rights).
2009]
HeinOnline -- 25 Const. Comment. 541 2008-2009
542 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 25:521
Farber's history of the Ninth Amendment, of course, is only
half of his book. The second half is devoted to exploring how
courts can go about identifying and enforcing the fundamental
individual rights Farber believes are protected under the Ninth
and Fourteenth Amendments. Here Farber eschews any particu-
lar "global theory" of constitutional rights and instead advocates
the kind of pragmatic form of judicial review that he has pre-
sented in previous works. Embracing an approach that seems at
once descriptive (this is what courts have always done) and hesi-
tantly normative (we are wise to follow the general views of the
Founders), Farber presents a series of factors that he believes
can both guide and constrain judicial enforcement of fundamen-
tal rights. But Farber never clearly provides a normative reason
for embracing his pragmatic approach, and those who follow the
tenets of originalism have good reason to reject his international-
ist reading of the Ninth.
CONCLUSION
Much has happened since the Founding. The Thirteenth,
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments introduced new liberta-
rian rights, significantly altering the original balance of federal
and state power, while at the same time establishing a new vision
of American freedom. An originalist committed to the norma-
tive theory of popular sovereignty must reconcile these (and
other) exercises of the people's sovereign will. If the retained
rights of the people under the Ninth Amendment involved only
fundamental individual rights, then it would be possible that the
Fourteenth Amendment applied this same set of rights against
the states. However, we know that the retained rights of the
Ninth Amendment included all matters not left to federal con-
trol. Unless one interprets the Fourteenth as having nationalized
every aspect of local municipal law and state responsibilities,
there remain aspects of the original Ninth Amendment which
are left to the control of people in the several states as a matter
of right. Originalists are therefore left with the task of determin-
ing the extent to which the Fourteenth Amendment nationalized
certain freedoms which, prior to 1868, had remained under local
control as a matter of right. 7
57. A common move by libertarian Ninth Amendment scholars has been to posit a
broad set of libertarian rights protected by the Ninth and then claim that the seemingly
similar text of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment pro-
tects the same set of rights. This move allows one to skip over what remain exceedingly
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Nor are the results of such an inquiry necessarily "conserva-
tive" or "liberal." We may find that although the First Amend-
ment was considered a "privilege or immunity," the non-
establishment of religion was not. Perhaps parental rights were
considered fundamental, perhaps also property and contract
rights. Perhaps not. The point is that a commitment to original-
ism is a commitment to following the trail of evidence wherever
it leads. In this regard, Daniel Farber is surely right to upbraid
any proponent of original understanding who refuses to apply
the theory when it appears to lead in an uncomfortable direc-
tion. But Farber's book also stands as a warning to those who
would use originalism as a form of political jujitsu. The move
may work well enough for the moment, but there remains the
on-going possibility that new historical discoveries will reveal
that one's opponents were more right than they knew.
difficult questions about the original meaning and ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment. In the end, however, this is like using frog DNA to fill in missing portions
of dinosaur DNA. In both situations, the project has good intentions but the outcomes
are less than ideal. See MICHAEL CRICHTON, JURASSIC PARK (1991). If one's reading of
the original Ninth is in error, so too will be one's reading of the Fourteenth.
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